i82 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV. 



Thus It appears to be true, what the Bifhop of "Worceftcr has 

 maintained in his difpute with Mr Locke, that all our Ideas are not 

 derived from Senfation or Reflection, but that many of them are 

 from Reafon * ; by which he means the Mind operating oiherwife 

 than either by Senfe or Refledion. 



Mr Locke has thought proper to clafs our Ideas according to their 

 origin, as he conceived it. But the Antients diftinguifhed betwixt 

 the origin of them, and the chiffification or arrangement of them. 

 With refpe(ft to the arrangement, they diftributed them into ten 

 clalfes, called Predicaments or Categories; and human wifdom has 

 not invented any better divifion of them : As to the origin of them, 

 they confidered that as a feparate fubjedt of inquiry, of which I have 

 faid a good deal in this chapter, and fliall fay more in the next. 



But, before I leave the fubjedl of Mr Locke's philofophy, I can- 

 not help obferving, that, not only the Matter of it is very erroneous 

 and imperfedV, but the language of it, and the terms of art he ufes, 

 are fuch as I cannot approve of. 



The language of antient philofophy, which came down from the 

 School of Pythagoras to the Academy and Lycaeuviy is fhort, clear, 

 and comprehenfivc, as their Ideas of things were. They divided the 

 univerfity of things according to their manner of exiftencc, whether 

 primary ox Jecondary \ calling thofe things which exifted /jrzwrt:^/)', 

 that is, independently by themfelvcs, Subjiances, and denominating 

 thofc things which had but Tifecondaty exiftcnce, dependent upon o- 

 thcr things, Jccidents. This diftindion of things Mr Locke has 

 endeavoured to ridicule t : He has, however, been obliged to ufe it, 



though 



• See the Bifliop of Worcefler's anfwer to Mr Locki:'s Jctter concerning fome 

 pafTages relating to his EflV.y of Human Underflanding, p. loo. 

 t Lib. 2. cap. 13- parag. rp. and 20. 



