i86 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV. 



CHAP. II. 



The general Propofition maintained in this Chapter ^ That all Ideas are 

 originally in the Mind, is demonjlratedfrom /^<? Nature o/" Ideas, and 

 the Dijlinciionbetivixt thernand^cnianons, — ^ II Ideas ffui^ origi7iatey 

 either from Mind or Body. — The Ideas ^External Forms^r/? fo«/?- 

 dered. — The Senfations zvhich thcfe Forms produce^ not Ideas, hoiv- 

 cver much generalized or ahft railed they may be. — Our Senfations not 

 the Materials out of nvhich Ideas can be made. — Ideas refenible the 

 Form of any Piece of Workmanfljipy ivhich is not from the Matter 

 but from the Mind of the Artijl. — Without Senfations ive cannot 

 have Ideas ; but Senfations, therefore^ are not the Caufe of our 

 J Ideas. — They are excited by Senfations — are lejs perfetl at frft — 



more perfect afterivards. — Some fo perfect as not to exijl at all in 

 Matter. — 0/"Ideas of Reflcdion. — Every individual Perception of 

 the Operation of our Mind, u, according to Mr Locke, aji Idea. — 

 — This not true. — There mujl be the Knowledge of the Nature of 

 the Operation. — This cannot be it'ithout the Knowledge of the A- 

 gent. — This Knowledge can only be derived from Mind. — The only 

 ^efiion remaining is^ Whether our Mind creates its Ideas ? — This 

 cannot be conceived. — Ideas cannot be difcovered in the Objects in 

 nvhich they are inherent ^ iinlefs they be previoufly knoivn. — The 

 Soul being a diflincl Subftance, puts this A'lattcr out of doubt. — No 

 Soul can be ivithout Ideas. — If it creates Ideas, it creates itfelf. — 

 This impoffible. — Jill our Ideas, as ivell as our Minds, are from 

 God. — In his Mind the Ideas cannot be abflr acted from Matter. — 

 This Origin of our Ideas much nobler than that afftgned by Mr 

 Locke — is the conftqucnce of our being made after the Image of 

 God. — No innate Ideas in one Sevfe. — A previous State of the 



Human 



