i88 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV. 



changeable, and which to know is the only Knowledge and Science *. 

 And, as this internal Nature and Eflence of every corporeal form is 

 nothing elfe but tliat internal principle which moves the Body, — 

 makcsit cohere, — producesall its Qualities and Accidents, — and which, 

 therefore, can be nothing elfe but Mind, as it is Mind that gives 

 being and energy to every thing; — I fay, it is only from Mind that our 

 knowledge of this or of any other Mind can be derived, and not 

 from Body, which never can produce Mind, nor any conception of 

 Mind, 



All our Ideas, it is evident, mufl: originate either from Mind or 

 Body : I will begin with thofe which are moft likely to originate 

 from Body,— I mean our Ideas of external Forms ; of which as we 

 have Ideas as well as Senfations, it is fometimes, as I have obferved f, 

 not eafy to diftinguifh the one from the other. 



Mr Locke has been pleafed to call even our particular Senfations 

 by the name of Ideas : But this is a language which no Man, who 

 cither thinks or fpeaks accurately, will ufe ; and the utmoft that 

 the greateft Materialift can pretend, is, that our Senfations, when 

 abftradted and generalized, become Ideas. But I think I have fhown 

 moft evidently, that Senfations, however abftradted from the Mat- 

 ter which produces them, or from one another, or, however much 

 generalized, that is, applied to different fubjedis, are ftill no more 

 than Senfitions, that is, impreiTions made upon our organs of Senfe, 

 preferved in our Phantafia or Memory J. And, if Senfations, by be- 

 ing 



• To kno'M, therefore, in the language of Plato, Is ipxrt<rl»i ms ounxi : And 

 Ideas are, in his language, the r* «»t»,- o>t», and uTxvratf «im tx,tir»; while things, 

 In generation and corruption, ouk is-tj, ttxxx yi»Tii. The more I ftudy the do£trine 

 and the language of this philofopher, the more I admire him ; and I am perfuaded 

 that no man ever knew more of the inmoft Nature of Things, without excepting even 

 his fcholar Ariflotle, or had more exalted notions, both of divine and human things, 

 than Plato. 



t P. 69. 



< P. 78. 



