Chap. II. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 191 



Here, therefore, we have two fets of Ideas, which cannot be de- 

 rived from Matter, becaufe they do not exifl in Matter; and in this 

 they differ from other Ideas which exift in material objedts, as well 

 as in our Minds. If then we have Ideas which we do not exift in 

 Matter, but only in our Minds, and which, therefore, cannot be de- 

 rived from Matter, we ought not, as I {aid in the beginning of this 

 chapter, to divide the matter, but to fuppofe that all our Ideas are 

 originally in the Mind. — And fo much for the Ideas of fenfible ob- 

 jed:s. 



As to Ideas of Reflexion, Mr Locke does not pretend that they 

 arife immediately from the objedls of Senfe ; but they arife, accor- 

 ding to him, from our Confcioufnefs of our perceptions, of thofe 

 objedts : And every individual perception of the operation of our 

 Minds upon thofe objeds, is an Idea in his language, as well as 

 every individual Senfation. But I deny the one as well as the o- 

 ther ; and I fay there can be no Idea without fome knowledge of 

 the Nature of the Thing. Now, it is impoffiblc that we can have 

 any knowrledge of the Nature of any operation^ without knowing 

 fomething of the Agent. In order, therefore, to have an Idea of 

 Perception, Volition, Thinking, and Reafoning, we muft know that 

 the Agent in thefe operations is fome Inviiible Power, by whatever 

 name we call it, whether Mind or Spirit, And fo far even the moft 

 barbarous nations have Ideas of Refle<Slion ; for they know that all 

 that they themfelves do is the operation of a principle, which is di- 

 ftindl from their Bodies and will furvive their Bodies. And thus 

 it appears, that the Ideas of the operations of our own Minds, as 

 well as the Ideas of fenfible objedts, are all originally from Mind, 

 .and not from Body. 



The only queftion then remaining is. Whether our Ideas arc 

 created by the Mind? — or, Whether they are always in the Mind, but 



