196 ANTIKNT METAPHYSICS. Book IV. 



end, at once, of the dodrine of the pre-exlAenceof Souls; becaufewe 

 certainly are not conrdoiis of what paiicd in our former ftatc. But here, 

 again,theBifliopof Worcefter isrigft,\vho,inhisanfwertoMrLocke's 

 Second Letter, maintains, that, for Identity Confcioufnefs is not 

 neceilary, but only tliat the Vital or Intelle6lual Principle Ihould 

 continue the fame, whatever Hate it may be in. And, indeed, the 

 confounding Confcioufnefs with Identity, is one of the groflefl and 

 moil: nonfeiiiical errors of modern Metaphyfics, fuch as never enter- 

 ed into the imagination of any antient philofopher * : For it is con- 

 founding the evidence of a thing with the thing itfelf; confciouf- 

 nefs being no more than a proof, which our memory furniflies us, of 

 our prior exigence ; — a proof, indeed, as clear as any we have of our 

 prefent exiftence, of which Confcioufnefs is the only proof. But, 

 fuppofe we have not that proof, will it from thence follow that we 



did 



• WVioever will take the trouble to read, with attention, what Mr Loclce has 

 written upon the fubje£l of PerfonaJ Identity, will not think this cenfure too fe- 

 vere. It is the moft obfcure and perplexed piece of reafoning I ever read, upon a 

 fubje<J\ in which there is really no difficulty, if he had known the nature of the 

 thing which he has made the fubje£l of his book ; I mean Ideas : For, if he had 

 known that the Idea of every corporeal thing is that internal principle which makes 

 the particles, that compofe it, cohere together, produces its movements, and all its 

 qualities and properties ; — in fliort, makes the thing what it is, he would have 

 been at no lofs to know what conltitutes the Identity of every thing in the Animal, 

 Vegetable, or Mineral kingdoms. And, if he had underflood, as he ought to have 

 done, the philofophy cf Mind, he would have known, that this principle of Iden- 

 tity could be nothing elfe but Mind ; which being, by its nature, eternal, continues 

 always the fame, while the Body to which it is annexed is in a perpetual change 

 and flux. He appears to have had fome glimpfe of this truth with refpe£t to Vege- 

 tables and Brute Animals; for he fays, that it is the principle of vitality which 

 conflitutes their Identity. But, what evidence is there that this principle always 

 continues the fame ? He will not (ay that there is confcioufnefs in the Vegetable j 

 and I think he will hardly affirm that it is in the Brute, though he ought to fay fo, 

 fince, according to his philofophy, Confcioufnefs accompanies all perceptions of 

 every kind. Now, if the principle of the Brute or Vegetable continues always the 

 fame, though there be no evidence of it from Confcioufnefs, Why may not that 

 principle in Man, which we call the boul, continue always the fame, though want- 

 ing likewife the evidence of Confcioufnefs. 



