202 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV. 



us only with Ideas, we fliould be able to make but final! progrefs in 

 knowledge ; as, in this ftate of our exiftence, we cannot immediate- 

 ly and intuitively fee^the connedion of our Ideas, otherwife than by 

 Circuit and Colleaion,— that is, by Reafoning, Now, in reafoning, 

 • as Ariftotle has well obferved, nothing could be proved, if every 

 thing was to be proved. There muft, therefore, be fome propofi- 

 tions which are felf-evident, and the foundation of all our Reafoning. 

 Thefe propofitions I hold alfo to be from Nature, as well as the Ideas 

 of which they are compofed ; for they certainly are not from Senfe, 

 nor from Rcafon or Argument. 



And here we may obferve, that, in this refpe£t alfo, we differ from 

 Superior Intelligences only in degree : For thefe Intelligences mull 

 fee very many things intuitively, which we can only fee by inference 

 and dedudlion ; and the Supreme Intelligence muft fee every thing 

 in that way : But it was of abfolute neceffity that we fhould fee fome- 

 thing in that way, otherwife we never could have difcovered any 

 thing by Reafoning. 



Thus, I think, I have fhown, that Ideas are as different from Sen- 

 fations in their Origin, as they are in their Nature — that Senfations 

 arife from the impreflion of Material Objeifls upon the Organs of our 

 Senfe ; and, therefore, they indicate nothing but the various Motions 

 of thefe objetfls, and the alteration thereby produced upon our or- 

 gans — that they only ferve the purpofe of the Animal Life, and, 

 therefore, are common to us with the Brute, and are retained in the 

 Memory and Phantafia, as long only as they are ncceffary for the 

 purpofes of that Life; — That, on the other hand. Ideas are from the 

 Mind itfelf — That they indicate to us the Nature of things, that is, 

 the Form without the Matter — that, as they are from Mind, they 

 are, like Mind itfelf, eternal, being there before our exiftence in 

 this life, and continuing after we ceafe to exift here — and, lajilyy 



that 



