26o ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IV. 



but thefe are not the caufe of lis perceptions, any more than a man 

 who ftands betwixt me and any obje£t, by moving out of the way, 

 is the caufe of my feeing that objevl:, 



7V/7/0, It is univerfally agreed that Matter, though animated by 

 the Vegetable Life, has not this power of perception by the Phanta- 

 fia, any more than by the Senfes ; perception in both thefe ways, 

 and the confequence of fuch perceptions, viz. Inclination and Aver- 

 fion, Pleafure and Pain, being the pecuHar properties by which the 

 Scnfitive Nature is diftinguiQied from the Vegetable. 



4/9, Neither is the Phantafia to be confounded with the Intellect,, 

 the objeds of the two being intirely different; for nothing is more 

 juft than the obfervation of Synefius, that the Phantafia is the feat of 

 thin"-s in generation or corruption, or the rx ym(/.im, as he expreffes 

 it ; whereas the other is the feat of the ra. ovra., which, in the language 

 of Plato and his followers, is what I call Ideas, being things that 

 have a real exiftence ^ whereas corporeal fubftances are in a conflant 

 change and viciffitude of generation and corruption. And it is alfo 

 very well obferved by Syncfms, that it is the Form, without the Alat- 

 ter ; by which we are not to underftand, that it is that inward Form 

 which conftitutes the nature and eflence of every thing, and is no 

 other, as I have fhown, than the Idea of the thing ; but it is the 

 outward Form of the thing, fuch as is reprefented to us in painting, 

 or in a mirror.. 



Of this dlftindion betwixt the Phantafia and the Intelledl our 

 daily experience may convince us : For, as the objeds of the two 

 are quite different, fo are their operations ; the Intelled reviewing 

 and correding the appearances in /the Phantafia, and informing us 

 that they are no more than Phantafms, and often wild and extrava- 

 gant Phantafins. And it is a common faying, and a very juft one, 



that 



