Chap. VI. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 



^97 



Nor is it for no purpofe that Nature has given to thefc animals 

 this wonderful power of Mind ; fince without it they could not car- 

 ry on their oeconomy, or picferve themfelves and their race. For 

 this purpofe, Human Intelligence, as 1 have obferved, would not be 

 fufficient ; nor could the Dog and Serpent, in the inftances 1 have 

 given, have found their way home, to which Nature had given 

 them the difpofition to return, if that Intelligence had been their 

 only guide. 



Here, therefore, we have a faculty of Mind, dilTerent from Hu- 

 man Intelligence and fuperior to it in fome refpeds, beftowed by 

 the Author of Nature upon the Brutes for enabling them to anfwer 

 the ends of their being, and to live the life for which they were 

 deftined by Nature. 



Thofe who are not acquainted with the extenfive views which 

 the antients had of Nature, and who judge of Mind only by the 

 powers which they fee exerted by the human Mind in its prefent 

 ftate, do not know what to make of Inftindt, and think it one of 

 the myfteries of Nature not to be explained. But thofe, who have 

 ftudied the philofophy of Plato and Ariftotle, know that Nature, as 

 they define it, comprehends the Brute, as well as the Vegetable and 

 Bodies unorganized — in fhort, whatever has not Intelligence and 

 Confcioufnefs. Now, if even Bodies unorganized, Brute and lifelefs 

 Matter, as it is commonly called, has an inward principle which 

 governs its motions, and makes them all lublervient to the purpofes 

 of Nature, there would be fomething very defcdive and anomalous 

 in Nature, if her nobler produdion, I mean the Animal race, was 

 not governed by the fame principle. We are not, therefore, to won- 

 der, that the Animal docs things which cannot be accounted for 

 from any faculties that we at prefent polTefs, fuch as Senfe, Memo- 

 ry, Imagination, and Reafoning, provided it appear that thofe 

 Vol. II. P p things 



