326 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V. 



ture, as It continued at reft; before it was moved *. If this be true, 

 there is an end of the antient philofophy, which I have endeavoured 

 to maintain in this and the preceding Volume, and of the diftindion 

 I have made betwixt Mind and Body, by which I make Mind to be 

 the only moving Power in the univcrfe, whereas Body is that 

 which only is moved, and which, by its nature, is abfolutely inca- 

 pable of moving itfelf, or of either beginning or continuing Motion. 

 As this diftindion is the foundation of my whole Philofophy, and 

 as it is undoubtedly a metaphyfical queftion of very great impor- 

 tance, What is the Caufe of the continuation of Motion ? which ne- 

 ver can be properly determined, without knowing accurately the 

 nature of Body, and wherein it differs eflentially from Mind, I hope 

 the reader will not think that, from the vanity and affedation of 

 matching myfelf with fuch an antagonift as Sir Ifaac Newton, I have 

 gone out of my way, when I have endeavoured to defend my Philo- 

 fophy againft principles that are entirely fubverfive of it, and to 

 fhow that Sir Ifaac has not rightly determined this metaphyfical 

 queftion concerning the continuation of Motion. 



If any further apology were neceflary for my differing from Sir 

 Ifaac, I think I can fay that the Syftem of Theifm, to maintain 

 which, as I have faid, is the principal defign of this work, is materi- 

 ally concerned : For, if it be admitted that our Solar Syftem has 

 gone on for fix thoufand years ^ without the agency of any Mind, 



Supreme 



* This is evident from Sir Ifaac's definition of the Fis Infita, which is in thefe 

 words : • Materiae Vis Infita cfl potcntia refiftendi, qua corpus unumquodque, 

 ' quantum in fe eft, perfeverat in ftatu fuo vel quiefcendi vel movendi uniformiter 

 ' in diredlum.* So that, according to Sir Ifaac, by the fame neceflity of its nature. 

 Matter or Body, for he does not diftinguifli thefe two, refts, or is in Motion ; 

 whereas, it is a fundamental maxim of the philofophy I defend, that Body is, by its 

 nature, abfolutely pafTive and inactive, fo that Motion is altogether foreign to its 

 nature, and adventitious, proceeding from a thing whofe nature and efllnce it is 

 to move, as much as it is the nature and eflcnce of Body to be at reft. 



