Chap. III. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 351 



certainly confifl: of parts, into which it is actually divided, and which 

 cannot poflibly have any co-exiftcnce. 



To be convinced that it is only the continuity of the feveral Mo- 

 tions that makes the Motion one, let us fuppofe any perceptible flop 

 or interruption of the Motion : Then every one is fenfible of the 

 divifion of the Motion, which before he did not perceive on account 

 of the continuity. But the divifion was before as real : For, if the Bo- 

 dy, after it has been moved from the place A to the place B, is mo- 

 ved on to the place C, there are there two Motions, as much as if 

 the Body had flopped at B, and then had proceeded on to C ; for 

 the number of Motions mufl be the fame, whether there be an in- 

 terval betwixt the Motions or not ; and, if a Caufe was abfolutely 

 neceffary for the firft Motion from A to B, it will not be lefs necef- 

 fary for the fecond Motion, from B to C, whether there be an in^ 

 terval betwixt them or not. 



Where there is an interval, every Body will acknowledge that an- 

 other Caufe is neceffary for the fecond Motion, or a new exertion 

 of the fame Caufe. But why (hould not that be likewife neceffary, 

 fuppofe there fhould be no interval ? The Motions are as different 

 from one another in the one cafe as in the other ; and mufl not dif- 

 ferent Effe<Sls have different Caufes ? 



There cannot, therefore, be any difference betwixt the two cafes,, 

 except that, in the one cafe, the Caufe of the Motion, or Moving 

 Power, exerts itfelf continually ; whereas, in the other cafe, it ads 

 by remitting or interrupted energies. 



It may be thought that Motion begets Motion, and, therefore, 

 that the firfl Motion from A to B is the caufe of the fecond Mo- 

 tion from B to C. But thofc who fpeak in this way, do not, I 



doubt, 



