362 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book V 



kind, though of a different fpecies. This principle in Animals is, 

 as it is well known, affected and influenced by external objects, and, 

 in confequence of that influence, produces various movements. 

 Now, I fay, that, in like manner, this principle of movement in Bo- 

 dies unorganized, fuch as the proje£tile, being affe£ted by the ac- 

 tion of the impelling Body upon it, in a manner analogous to the 

 way in which the Mind of the Animal is affeded by the a£lion of 

 external objedls upon its Organ of Senfe, carries it on for fome 

 time, and produces all thofe fucceflive changes of Place, that is, 

 fo many different Motions, which, as I have fhown, it is impoflible 

 to account for from the original impulfe : And the only difference 

 betwixt the two cafes is, that, in the cafe of Animals, the impref- 

 fion of external objedts operates upon the Mind of the Animal, 

 and produces the Motions of his Body, through the medium of Ap- 

 petites and Defires ; whereas, in the cafe of unorganized Bodies, 

 the imprefl^ion of external objeds operates diredly and immediately 

 upon the Mind, or Principle of Motion, in them. And in the fame 

 manner this impreflTion operates upon Bodies organized, fuch as 



Vege- 



the words above quoted from Ariftotle .-nakes It perfe£lly clear, without the autho- 

 rity of Simplicius, or of any other commentator. — This is Nature, which, as wc 

 have feen, comprehends the Brute, but it does not comprehend Man, becaufe he 



has Intelligence in himfelf : And thus Nature and Man are diftinguiftied. As 



to the diftindlion betwixt Nature and Arty Ariftotle has alfo given it in the above 

 quoted firft chapter of the fecond book, De Naturali Aufcultatione -, and the 

 diftinclion is this, That the things of Nature have a Principle of Motion in them- 

 felves : Whereas the things of Art, confidered as things of Art, have no fuch prin* 

 ciple, but are all moved from without, either by the Artiftimmediately and directly, 

 or by fome Power employed by him. 



In this w^y, Nature is diftinguiflied from Cod and Alan, as well as from Jrt — di- 

 ftindtions, I will again repeat it, which are not to be found in any modern book of 

 philofophy : And yet, how contemptible muft a philofophy appear, that cannot accu- 

 rately diftinguifli thefe things ! and how contemptible a philofopher that cannot 

 tell even what he himfelf is ! 



