PREFACE. xli 



but, in my opinion, not near fo philofoph'ical ; for they derive if, 

 as well as the other virtues, from the nature and conflitution of the 

 human mind, with this difference hctwixt it and the other three virtues, 

 that thefe belong each to different parts of the mind ; but juftice be- 

 longs to all the three parts, as I have above explained it, and confifts 

 in the harmony and concord of thefe three with one another ; fo that 

 it is the moft comprehenfive of all the virtues ; whereas Ariftotle 

 has explained it, not as a Philofopher, but according to the popular 

 notions, and applied it only to external things, fuch as mojiey^ power ^ 

 and honour ; which is no more than applying the general definition 

 of the Pythagoreans to particular things comprehended under it. 

 for it is impoffible that if the other three virtues exift, and there be 

 a perfed harmony in the mind, there can be any wrong done to 

 others in the articles of wealth, power, or honour. 



What has always pleafed me moft in Ariftotle's morals is, the dif- 

 tindion which he makes betwixt vice and iveahiefs^ and betwixt 

 virtue and that rejlraint and endurafice which we fee men pradife, 

 and which often paffes for virtue ; and as I did not find this dif- 

 tindion in Plato, I gave Ariftotle great credit for it, believing It to be 

 a difcovery of his own ; but when I came to ftudy thofe Pythagorean 

 fragments which Gale has colleded, I was very much furprifed to 

 find the fame diftinclion made, and, I think, better explained, by 

 the Pythagorean Philofopher I have fo often quoted, viz. Theages, 

 in his work upon Virtue.. The principle he lays down is, what I 

 have already mentioned, that the TTfoa^pscr;? is efiential to virtue ; or, 

 in other v/ords, that virtue muft proceed from free inclination, 

 founded upon judgment and deliberate choice; therefore, fays he, 

 if with force and compulfion reafon govern the ^u/^o? and the S7ri9v[/,icc^ 

 that is, the irafcthle and concupifcent parts of our nature ; this pro- 

 duces thofe difpofitions of the mind we call syK^ccTsicc and Koi^TB^iu^ 



Vol. III. g that 



