Chap. IIT. APPENDIX. 



337 



Oiitang being a Man. — If theOrang Oittang be not a Man, Peter the 

 Wild Boy is not one. — A further Account of Peter from an Oxford 

 Gentleman. -—Some ReJleSlions upon that Account. 



Iwill conclude this Appendix with fome obfervations upon a fub- 

 jed, of which I have treated in more than one place of this 

 work, but which is of fuch importance in the philofophy of Man, 

 being the very foundation of it, that I think it deferves fome further 

 illuftration. The fubjed I mean is the dirtindion betwixt Man and 

 other Animals. 



That it is by the Intelledual part of our nature we are fo dillin- 

 guifbed, every body will admit. If, therefore, it be true that the 

 Brutes have Intelled as well as we, there is an end of the diftinc- 

 tlon betwixt us and them ; and we muft fubmit to be Brutes, with 

 the difference, perhaps, of fome fuperiority upon our fide, fuch as 

 we obferve among the individuals of our own fpecies, or even a- 

 mong the brutes themfelves. This, therefore, is a queftron very in- 

 terefting to every man who has any fenfe of the dignity of his na- 

 ture ; and I propofe, in this Chapter, to try whether I cannot make 

 the diftindion betwixt the Intelled of a Man and the Senfe of a 

 Brute. But it is only by the affiflance of Antient Philofophy that I can 

 do fo: For it is a didindion that is not made in any modern book of 

 philofophy that has fallen into my hands, but, on the contrary, our 

 ftandard book for the philofophy of Mind, I mean Mr Locke's Ef- 

 fay, has plainly confounded Ideas and Senfations ; and Mr David 

 Hume has even given the preference to Senfations, by telling uy 

 that an Idea is but a weaker Senllition. Now, if there be no diftinc- 

 tion betwixt Senfations and Ideas, there is certainlv none betwixc 

 Senfe and Intelled. 



Vol. III. U u It 



