.342 



APPENDIX. Chap. III. 



fhape, colour, or whatever elfe affeds our organs of fenfe ? Indeed, 

 I hold it impoflible to conceive that an immaterial fubftance can ad:, 

 in any way, upon the organs offence, in which way only it can be 

 apprehended by Senfe : And, as we know but of two gnoftic pow- 

 ers, namely, Senfe and Intelled, it follows of neceifary confequence, 

 that thefe eternal and unchangeable things can only be apprehended 

 and known by Intelligence. 



I have obferved, more than once in the courfe of this work, that 

 our intelled perceives the particular ideas of things only by their re- 

 lation to ideas more general, or, in other words, it is only by Ge- 

 nus and Species that we comprehend any thing ; and, when we are 

 faid to know a thing, the meaning is, that we know to what genus 

 or fpecies it belongs. In this way we know all animals, vegetables, 

 and minerals, and, in fhort, every thing that falls under our ob- 

 fervation. And, though we may know particular qualities diftin- 

 guilhing individuals from others of the fame fpecies or genus, yet 

 thefe very qualities we know by reference to general ideas of fuch 

 qualities : And the reafon of this phaenomenon of the intelledual 

 nature, which I may call extraordinary, as it has never been attended 

 to by the philofophers of this age, is, that intelligence, by iis nature, 

 can perceive nothing but in fyflcm *. And, therefore, as I have ob- 

 ferved elfewhere t» we are going on, from the time we firft begin to 

 ufe our intellect, in a continued progrefs from greater to lefler fyf- 

 tems, till we come at lafl: to the fyftem of the univerfe, the contem- 

 plation of which, and of its great author, is the fupreme felicity of 

 our intelledual nature. 



Thus, it appears that ideas can only be apprehended by intelled ; 

 and, therefore, unlefs we deny, as Mr Hume does, that there is fuch 

 a thing as ideas, and maintain that what we call Ideas are nothing but 



weaker 



♦ Vol. i. p. 60. Vol. ii. p. 108. 

 f Vol. ii. p. 90. 91. 



