34^ APPENDIX. Chap. IIL 



For both which purpofes Nature has furniflied him with wonderfui 

 propcnfities, or inftin(fts, as they are commonly called ; and, to 

 the gratification of the appetites and defires, which arife from thefe 

 propcnfities, the fame Nature has been fo bountiful as to annex a 

 great deal of pleafure. On the other hand, the objeifl, which the In- 

 telledlual Mind purfucs, is, as 1 have fliown *, the /^/r and the hand- 

 fome ; and its happinefs confifts in the contemplation of thefe. And, 

 though it purfue alfo what is iifeful and profitable for the being and 

 well being of the animal life, yet it is for the fake, not of the ani- 

 mal life itfelf, but of the to xaAov or beautiful ; which, therefore, is 

 tlie ultimate objetl of its purfuit in all things f. 



Another material difference, in practice, betwixt the Animal and 

 Intellectual Mind, is, that every adtioii of Intellect proceeds from 



an 



* Vol. ii. Lib. ii. cap. 5. 6. and 7. 



f There is a remarkable paflage to this purpofe in Porphyry's Life of Pythagoras, pu- 

 blifhed by Kufter, and printed at Amfterdam in the year 1 707 — a work which I think 

 of great value, as well as that of his fcholar Jamblichus, upon the fame fubjedl. Porphy- 

 ry there tells us that Pythagoras faid that our firft purfuit ought to be the fair ^ the ha?id- 

 foinej and and nvhat is of good report ; which is perfedlly agreeable to what the Apoftle 

 recommends to the Philippians, Chap. iv. V. 8. in thefe words : ' Finally, Bre- 



* thren, whatfoever things are true, whatfoever things are honefl, whatfoever things 



* are juft, whatfoever things are pure, whatfoever things are lovely, whatfoever 



* things are of good report -, if there be any virtue, if there be any praife, think on 



* thefe things.' Nor will the reader be furprifed to find that the purcft and fublimeft 

 philofophy of antient times, from which the philofophy of Plato and of Ariftotle de- 

 rived every thing that was of any value in them, fliould be {o agreeable to the doc- 

 rine of our Sacred Books. Our next purfuit, faid Pythagoras, ihould be the uftful, 

 or what is profitable in life, that is, what is neceflary for fupporting our animal na- 

 ture. And our third purfuit, and laft in order, fliould be pleafure, but not pleafure 

 of the vulgar kind, but fuch as is of an Intellecftual Nature, arifmg from the fair and 

 the handfome : So that, according to this noble philofophy, the re y,xx«v ought to be 

 the firfl and lafl of our purfuits ; and, I think, I have fhown, in the Chapters a- 

 bove quoted, that the Intelle<Stual Nature can have no other pleafure or enjoyment. 



