Chap. III. APPENDIX. 347 



an opinion formed concerning what is good or ill, beautiful or the 

 contrary, in the adlion. When we do fo, we are faid to a<ft from 

 ivill^ which is always determined by fome opinion formed, of the 

 kind I have mentioned : Whereas, when we adt from mere appe- 

 tite or inclination, without deliberation or opinion formed, we acSl 

 as the Brute does alvv^ays ; for he has no nvill^ but is prompted to 

 adlion by natural impulfe, or 0^/^75, as the Greeks call it *. 



A third very material difference is, that Intelk6V, in all its opera- 

 tions, propofes ends, and devifes means to accomplifh thefe ends ; 

 whereas the Inftind of the Brute proceeds without confideration, ei- 

 ther of ends or means. 



And thus it appears, that, in the pradical life, the Animal is as 

 different from the Intellectual Creature, as he is in knowledge and 

 apprehcnfion ; and, as we are compounded of the Animal and In- 

 telledlual nature, we may obferve, as I have faid, the fame differ- 

 ence in eur adions. 



From thefe obfervations, I think, it is evident, not only that Senfe 

 and Intelled are quite different in their natures and operations, but 

 belong to fubftances quite different ; and, therefore, that, though they 

 may be united in one corporeal frame, which is our cafe, yet they 

 ought to be confidered to be as diftind, as if they were in feparatc 

 bodies. This is an obfervation, I think, of great confequence in the 

 philofophy of Man, which never can be rightly explained, but up- 

 on the fuppofition that our Intelledtual Mind or Soul is a fubrtance 

 diftind; from our Animal or Senfitive Nature, though their opera- 

 tions be fo blended together, that it is a iwattcr of nice difccrnment, 



X X 2 and 



* See what I have (aid upon the fubjeft of tuillj and the difference betwixt it and 

 the oe^fcn of the brutes, in Vol. i. Book ii. Chap. 21. of this Work. 



