Chap. IIT. APPENDIX. 



oj 



lie any idea of thofe forms rifing one above another, and conftitu- 

 tlng what we call fpeciefes and genufes, fome more general, fomc 

 Jefs, till we afcend to univerfals ? I believe it will be hardly faid 

 that he has ; and yet, if he has not, I think, I have clearly fhown, 

 that he has not Ideas, without which it is impoffible he can be an 

 intelligent creature. Does he apprehend things In fyftem, in which 

 way only Intellea: apprehends them ? And, lajlly^ Is he confcious 

 of what he does ? Does he refled ? Does he make himfelf his own 

 objed:, and approve of or condemn himfelf, as we do ? He has not 

 therefore, the fame gnoflic powers that man has. 



As to pradice, there is not the lead reafon to believe that the ele- 

 phant, or any other brute, is determined to adion by any opinion 

 that he forms of what is good or ill, beautiful, or the contrary. And, 

 if it be true, what is faid above, it is impoffible he can have an idea 

 of what is good or beautiful, or, indeed, any ideas at all. And 

 there is as little reafon to fuppofe that he propofes ends in his ac- 

 tions, and contrives means for accomplifhing thefe ends. 



And thus, I think, it is evident that, by whatever other principle 

 of adion the Brute may be guided in his operations, it is not by In- 

 telled. And, indeed, if it were, his Intelled muft be fuppofed to 

 be an Intelled of a much more perfed kind than ours : For his ope- 

 rations, efpecially in his natural ftate, are much more ao-reeable to 

 truth and nature than our adions, and, indeed, are perfed of the 

 kind ; and he has a knowledge of fome things, much fuperior to 

 what we can acquire by any memory, imagination, intelligence or 

 reafon, that we are mafters of, of which I have elfewhere mention- 

 ed fome wonderful initances *. 



If 



* See upon this fubjeft. Vol. ii. Book iv. Cap. 6. where I have mentioned fome 

 wonderful examples of the operations of Inftinft, far furpaihng any thine that we 



can 



