xxviii INTRODUCTION. 



would accrue were the passage accomplished ; still 

 problems of scientific interest, which were less under- 

 stood then than now, would be solved, and success 

 could not but redound to the national honour and 

 renown. 



Looking back with our present knowledge it may 

 well seem unaccountable that the idea of succour 

 becoming necessary never entered into the minds of 

 Franklin, or the most experienced of his contemporaries, 

 and that no single precaution for relief was ever con- 

 templated before the expedition sailed. We now, 

 indeed, know that if it had been arranged that in the 

 summer of 1847 an expedition should proceed to some 

 appointed rendezvous in Barrow Strait, there to remain 

 until the autumn of 1848, it is certain that most if not 

 all the surviving crew would have been rescued ; we 

 know this now because we know where the ships were 

 abandoned, and that the spot was within reach of such 

 succour ; but had they penetrated a hundred miles 

 further westward it would have taken them out of such 

 reach ; all attempts however at rescue, at whatever 

 time undertaken, would have been in vain, unless pre- 

 arranged with Franklin. This is the fatal mistake 

 which experience has taught us, and which can never 

 be repeated ; but had it been recognised as a necessity 

 to send a second expedition one or two years after the 

 departure of the first, to secure its safety, would the 

 ' Erebus ' and ' Terror,' it may be asked, have sailed at 

 all ? Would not the question have arisen, ' Is expedi- 

 tion to follow expedition while a ship remains absent ? ' 

 and there could probably have been but one reply. 

 Much has been written by theorists, after the event, to 

 prove that the long and fruitless search was made in 

 the wrong direction, and that where Franklin was 



