ANIMISM. II 



a purely metaphysical relation — pre-established har- 

 mony: — "Soul and body agree in virtue of this 

 harmony, the harmony pre-established since the 

 creation, and in no way by a mutual, actual, physical 

 influence. Everything that takes place in the soul 

 takes place as if there were no body, and so every- 

 thing takes place in the body as if there were no 

 soul." At this point we almost reach a scientific 

 materialism. It is easy for the materialist to break 

 this frail tie of pre-established harmony which so 

 loosely unites body and soul, and to exhibit the 

 organism as under th-e sole control of universal 

 mechanics and physics. 



Thus the weak point of Stahl's animism was the 

 supposition of a direct action exercised on the organ- 

 ism by a distinct, heterogeneous, spiritual principle. 



Chauffard has endeavoured to avoid this pitfall. In 

 conformity with modern ideas, he has brought together 

 what the ancient philosophers and Stahl himself 

 separated — the activity of matter and the activity of 

 the soul. " Thought, action, function, are embraced 

 in an indissoluble union." This is the classical but 

 not very lucid theory which has been so often re- 

 produced — Homo f actus est anima vivens — which 

 Bossuet has expressed in the celebrated formula : 

 " Soul and body form a natural whole." 



A second objection raised against animism, is that 

 the soul acts consciously, with reflection, and with 

 volition, and that its essential attributes are not found 

 in most physiological phenomena, which, on the con- 

 trary are automatic, involuntary, and unconscious. 

 The contradictory nature of these characteristics has 

 obliged vitalists to conceive of a vital principle 

 distinct from thought. Chauffard, agreeing here with 



