l8 LIFE AND DEATH. 



The Reasons given by the Vitalists for distinguishing' 

 Soul from Life. — It is, in particular, on the opposite 

 side, in the psychical world, that the early vitalists pro- 

 fessed to entrench themselves. We have just seen that 

 their doctrines were not so subtle as those of to-day ; 

 the vital principle to them was a real agent, and not an 

 ideal plan in the process of being carried out. But 

 they distinguished this spiritual principle from another 

 co-existent with it in superior living beings — at any 

 rate, in man: the thinking soul. They boldly dis- 

 tinguished between them, because the activity of the 

 one is manifested by knowledge and volition, while 

 on the contrary, the manifestations of the other for 

 the most part escape both consciousness and volition. 



In fact, we know nothing of what goes on in the 

 normal state of our organs. Their perfect performance 

 of their functions is translated to us solely by an 

 obscure feeling of comfort. We do not feel the beat- 

 ing of the heart, the periodic dilations of the arteries, 

 the movements of the lungs or intestine, the glands at 

 their work of secretion, or the thousand reflex mani- 

 festations of our nervous system. The soul, which is 

 conscious of itself, is nevertheless ignorant of all this 

 vital movement, and is therefore external to it. 



This is the view of all the philosophers of antiquity. 

 Pythagoras distinguished the real soul, the thinking 

 soul, the Nous, the intelligent and immortal principle, 

 characterized by the attributes of consciousness and 

 volition, from the vital principle, the Psyche, which 

 gives breath and animation to the body, and which is 

 a soul of secondary majesty, active, transient, and 

 mortal. Aristotle did the same. On the one side he 

 placed the soul properly so called, the Nous or 

 intellect — that is to say, the understanding with its 



