Chap. VII. A NTIENT METAPHYSICS. 73 



which contains the lefs general, is called the Predicate of the propo- 

 fition ; whereas the lefs general is called the Suhje^. But this dif- 

 tindion, however obvious, and fuch, as that, without it, we cannot 

 have fo much as the idea of a Propofuion, Mr Locke has no where 

 made; fo totally ignorant he appears to have been of logic*. 



But to thofe, who know no more of logic nor of anlient philofo- 

 phy than Mr Locke did, it will be neceffary to explain in what fenfe 

 one idea can be faid to contain another, or the idea lefs general can 

 b faid to be a part of the more general. And, in the firft place, it 

 is not in the fenfe that one body is faid to be a part of another, or 

 the greater body to contain the lefler ; nor is it as one number is faid 

 to contain another ; but it is virtually or potentially that the more 

 general idea contains the lefs general. In this way the genus con- 

 tains the fpecies ; for the genus may be predicated of every fpecies 

 under it, whether exifting or not exifting ; fo that virtually it 

 contains all the fpeciefes under it, which exift or may exift. And not 

 only does the more general contain the lefs general, but (what at 

 firft fight may appear furprifing) the lefs general contains the more 

 general, not virtually or potentially^ but equally. Thus the genus 

 Animal contains virtually Man, and every other fpecies of animal 

 either exifting or that may exift: But the genus Animal is contained 

 in man, and in other animals aflually -, for man cannot exift with- 

 out being in a^uality^ and not potentially only, an animal f. 



There are only two ways in which the more general idea of a pro- 

 Vol. IV. K pofition 



* See what I have farther faid of Mr Locke's logic, in vol. I. of this work, p. 382. 

 and following. 



f See Book V. Chap. II. of vol. I. where this matter is explained at great length, 

 and particularly p. 479. where I have acknowledged that I got the diftindlion betwixt 

 containing potentially and aftually, upon which I think, the whole truth of the 

 Syllogifm depends, from a Greek now living, iiugeniut Dtaeonus. 



