CONTENTS. 



CHAP. XI. 



That Plato and Arlftotle differed on the Subjefl of Ideas, proted by Phlloponus and 

 by Ariftotle's own writings.-— The attempt to reconcile the two Philcfophers, found- 

 ed on a mifreprefentation of their Dodlrines. — Plato's Ideas immaterial fubllances, 

 — having a feparate exiftence. — Ariftotle fo underftood them, and argues againft 

 them ; — difliked the word Idea. — Plato's word Idea adopted, but not his Dod^rine: 

 Ariftotle's the univerfal opinion in modern times. — Individual things only cxifting 

 according to him : — General Ideas, fuch as Genus and Species, are Creatures of the 

 Human Underftanding, being only different ways of claffing and arranging things. 

 — Inconfiftency of his Logic with this opinion ; — Truth and Science can have no 

 foundation in nature ; — Ideas are mere Efiiia Rathfiir, as much as a Hippocentaur.—' 

 Arillotle maintains, that from Generals are derived Particulars : — Inconfiftency of 

 this opinion with the Doctrine that Generals do not exift. — If all things be Indivi- 

 duals, they muft be inmiediately derived from the firft Caufe j— No progreffion or 

 fubordination in Nature -, — the Individuals of the Animal, Vegetable, and Mmeral 

 Kingdoms, have proceeded immediately from him ; — the Ideas of all particular 

 things are In the Divine Mind ;— but it can have no general Ideas fuch as we have. 

 — This impious.—Or, if the Divine Mind have fuch Ideas, we muft maintain that 

 he collects them, as we do, from the particular fenfible objedVs. — If they were ori- 

 ginally in the Divine Mind, Can we believe that they have no exiflence in Nature, 

 entire and undivided;, but that only p.irts of them exift incorporated with matter, 

 and thefe proceeding without order or iubordination ?— Gregory Nazianzen's opi- 

 nion adopted by the Author, — According to that Philofopher, all the Ideas of the 

 Divine Mind realifed. — This the fublimeft Theology ; — it gives us, if pollible, the 

 Idea of Plato's ©so? 'y^ffgov^^f ; — and makes us concei\c how al! things are really and 

 a£\ually in God. — Exammation of Plato's Doctrine of Meas : — He mamt.uned the 

 real exiftence, in Nature, both of general and particidar Ide.is \ — that general 

 Ideas are immaterial iubft.mccs, from which Icfs general Ideas are an er.v.mation ; 

 — and that they end in indivi-iual ihings. — exemplification of this Do-Ilrine in the 

 cal'e of the general Idea of Animal. — A reality given to knowledge by this, fyftem ; 

 — the objects of .our knowledge are things re.dly exifling, not the operations of our 

 minds colleiltd from corporeal fubftances- — When in a more perfesft Aate, fays Pla- 

 to, we were converfant with the Ideas themlelves ; — but in ODr prefent flate we are 

 condemned to dig them out of the matter in which they are buried. — More reality 

 in our knov/ledge this w.iy conceived j and the truth of the Syllogifm more clearly 

 perceived, the more Genejral containmg the leQ; General : — Wliilc, by Anlloijc's 

 Do£trine, the Icfs General produces the more General ; — there i? no fubordination 

 of caufe and ciFc^, but all things derived at once from the Divine Mind ; — and or- 



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