Chap. VI. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. ny 



other objed:s which Iiave the fame dlftinguifhing peculiarities ; and 

 then it becomes what is called a general idea. 



But the ideas of objects of fenfe, however much they may be ge- 

 neralized, cannot give man that greatell happinefs ol nis nature, 

 about which we are now inquiring ; but it muiL be genercd ideas, 

 not of body only but of mind, and of fuperior minds, and ot the 

 fupreme mind, as far as we are capable to conceive that mind. 

 From that mind, we muft underftand, that all other minds are de- 

 rived, and the whole lyilem of this univerfe, ot the general princi- 

 ples of wt>ich we mufl iorm ideas. If, in this way, we can form 

 what may be called our IntelkBual worlds the man dwelling in fuch 

 a world will enjoy the greateft happinefs that human nature is capa- 

 ble of in this ftate of its exiftence. And it is in this refped: only 

 that our happinefs can be compared with the divine, though infinite- 

 ly inferior to it in degree, as muft be evident to any man who will 

 ftudy that fine account, which Ariftotle has given us, of the happi- 

 nefs of the divine nature *. 



As this is the nobleft ufe we can make of the higheft faculty we 

 have in our nature, it muft be, of neceflity, the greateft happinefs 

 that our nature is capable of; and it is fuperior even to that which 

 the pradlice of the virtues, called by Ariftotle the Ethical Virtues^ can 

 give us. They are called by Ariftotle Ethical T/V/z/^jf, becaufe they 

 are formed by cujlom and habit, more than by reafon or the exercife 

 of the intelledual faculty. They are well known to be four in num- 

 ber, Prudence^ yujlice^ lemperancCy and Fortitude. At the head of 

 them Prudence is very properly placed, as it is the exercile of our 

 intelled: guiding and direding the exercife of the other three vir- 

 tues ; which, without that diredion, could not properly be called 



P 2 virtues. 



* Metaph. Lib. 14. Cap. 7. 



t Magn. Moralia, Lib. i. Cap. 6, 



