138 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book III. 



Moralia^ where he defines the Beautiful and the Good to be, what 

 has^ jrj'tned with the Beautiful, every thing that can make it ufeful ; 

 for, fays he, a man is xaAoj-^aya^j?, when he has the ufe of thofc 

 good things, which can enable him to be ufeful, and to ad that part 

 in life which a man of a Beautiful character would choofe to adt. 

 Such good things, he fays, are wealth and power: By which it 

 would appear, that Ariftotle, by (tytx,6oi in the compofition of this 

 word, did not mean goodnefs of nature or difpofition, which he fup- 

 pofed to be included in xaXoj, but thofe external good things I have 

 mentioned. 



It may feem extraordinary, that a fyftem fhould be complete in 

 all its parts, and have every thing in it connected with every thing, 

 fo as to be perfedly Beautiful, according to my definition of Beauty, 

 and yet not be good. But every fyftem is intended, as I have faid, 

 to anfwer fome end. Now, though it be in itfelf very well fitted for 

 that purpofe, yet fome thing befide itfelf may be nectflary to make 

 it anfwer that purpofe : And if fo, the fyftem, though perfect ia 

 itfelf, i§ not good, as fomething is wanting to make it anfwer the 

 end for which it was intended. This may be illuftrated by many 

 examples, both from the works of nature and thofe of man. Sap- 

 pofe a body of a man, or of any other animal, perfetlly well formed, 

 yet if there is not a mind to animate that body, it is not Good, (though 

 it may be faid to be Beautiful^) becaufe it cannot perform the end 

 for which it was intended by God and Nature. And as to the works 

 of man, fuppofe any machine formed by him, as perfect as can be 

 imagined in all its parts, and confequently Beautiful, yet if there be 

 no power to fet it in motion, fo as to make it anfwer the end for 

 which it was intended, it is not good or ufeful, 



CHAP. 



