z64 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book III. 



CHAP. X. 



No Modern Philofopher has dijlinguijhed betwixt the operations oj our 

 IntelleB in forming Ideas and in comparing them together. — The 

 knowledge of this difiinBion neceffary for knowing what Man is,-^ 

 The defign of Arijiotles Logic being to Jhow what Science and 

 Iruth are, the f tidy of Logic preparatory to thefiudy of Philofophy, 



Mr Lockers Effay on the Human Underfanding, our only book of 



Logic in Englifo. — ImperfeBions of that work on the operations of 

 the Difcurfus Mentis; — Mr Locke fays little of Propofitions, — does 

 not make the difinSfion betwixt the Predicate and SubjeB, — did not 

 underjland the meaning of the wor^Syllogifm;— ^^j- told us, in a few 

 words, what Truth is, which Ariflotle has explained in his Catego- 

 ries, his Book of Interpretation and his Analytics. — Mr Locke full 

 on thefubjeB of Ideas. — Thefe to be conftdered in this chapter. — The 

 nature of them not explained by Arifotle nor by Porphyry in his Intro- 

 dudion to Arifotle s logic, — This defeSi attempted to be fupplied by 

 the Author. — Bifin6lion betwixt Particular and General Ideas necef 

 fary; — the former produce the latter. — Ourfrfi Ideas are of particu^ 

 lar Objects of Senfe : — Thcfe formed by feparating the peculiar qua- 

 litics of ObjeSls from the accidental: — Example of this operation re- 

 ferred to. — The nextfep is abftraBing them from the Body in which 

 they are inherent: — Mr Locke admits Ideas of this kind. — Then 

 generalifng them: — Ourfrjl General Ideas, of Speciefes ;—from thefe 

 we afcendto Gcnufes; — and from Genufes to the Categories. — Conju- 

 fton of Mr Locke on this SuhjtEl. — Propriety of Plato's Definition of 

 an Idea. — The ClajTts of the highef Genufes numbered by Archytas. — 

 The number of Speciefes and Genufes infinite with refpe^l to our ca- 

 pacities. 



