172 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IIL 



For It is by obferving that the idea we have formed of any particu- 

 lar fubje£t is to be found in other fubjedts, that we form the gene- 

 ral idea. Now, that is what is called hidudlloji^ when from particu- 

 lars we infer generals. 



From this obfcrvation of Ariftotle it is evident, that InduBion is 

 the foundation of all arts and fciences, (a propofition, which muft 

 appear very extraordinary to thofe who have not ftudied the antient 

 philofophy): For without general ideas there can be no art or fcience; 

 and as our firft ideas are, as I have fliown, of objeds of fenfe, the 

 firft induction, we muft make, is from objedts of fenfe, in which we 

 iind the idea we have formed of the particular objed:. 



But ideas, before they can be generalifed, muft be formed : And 

 we cannot know what a general idea is, till we firft know what an 

 idea itfelf is. Now this, I fay, Mr Locke did not know; for, as I have 

 {liown, he did not underftand the feveral operations of the mind, 

 by which particular ideas, abftradt ideas, and general ideas, are form- 

 ed. And though he fpeaks fo much of ideas, almoft in every page 

 of his tvv'o volumes, he does not appear to me to have known what 

 an idea is ; for he confounds ideas with fenfations, and, accor- 

 dingly, has made a clafs of ideas of fenfations^ as he calls them. And 

 he fpeaks of even children in the womb as having ideas * ; and of 

 the feelings of pleafure and pain as being ideas alfo f : And what 

 is ftill more extraordinary, he gives even to brutes ideas ; for he 

 fays that fmging birds retain in their memories the ideas of tunes 

 that they have learned J. 



But it may be afked, in defence of Mr Locke, Have wc then 



no 



♦ Book 2. Chap. 9. paragraph 7. 

 f Ibid. Chap. 20. in the beginning. 

 % Ibid. Chap. 10. paragraph laft. 



