174 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IIL 



the intellect operates iirft (and it could not be otherwife) upon ob- 

 ie(fts of fenfe, and of thefe forms what I call particular ideas^ 

 which, as I have fliown, are the firft ftep towards general ideas. 

 And as the fenfcs furnifh the materials of the ideas of objeds of 

 fenfe. or corporeal objects, fo reflexion, that is the confcioufHcfs of the 

 operations of our own minds, fiirnifhes the materials of our ideas of 

 rnind and its operations. If, therefore, Mr Locke had told us that the 

 materials of all our ideas of body or of mind, were furnifhed by fen- 

 fation and reflection, he would have given us a very true account of 

 the origin of our ideas. But inftead of telling us that fenfation and 

 refiedion are the fources of our ideas, he has told us that they are 

 themfelves our ideas. 



As Mr Locke's book, upon the Human L^ndcrftanding, is our 



ftandard book upon Logic, and, I believe, the only book upon that 



fubjecl that we have in Englidi, it might have been expedted, that 



he would have treated not only of ideas, but of proportions and of 



fyllogifms, which are formed of ideas by the difcurfive faculty of the 



mind, and which are the chief fubject of that great work of Arifto^ 



tie, of which I have given an account in the preceding chapter. 



But, as I have faid, I do not remember that he has any where, in 



his two volumes, mentioned the -woxf^fyllogifm, and I am very fure 



he did not underftand the nature of it. As to proportions, though 



he indeed fpeaks of them, I have fliown that he does not appear 



to have underftood the nature of them, any more than of the 



fyllogifm. 1 have alfo mentioned the account he gives of 7r///y6*, 



which, 1 think, is the mod imperfed and unfatisfac1:ory account that 



ever w^as given by any pliilofopher. Yet this book of Mr Locke's 



is taught in fome of our Univerfities as a compleat fyftem of Logic; 



and particularly in Cambridge, as I have been informed, there is a 



Profeflbr who gives ledures upon it ; while the Logic of Ariftotle, 



one of the greateft works of fcience, as I think I have Ihown, that 



ever 



• Page 167. 



