Chap. XI. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 197 



except in difpiiting with Plato, is ufed by this Pythagorean philofo- 

 pher; fo that Plato did not invent the word, but took it from the 

 Pythagorean fchool, and perhaps the dodrine alfo, if he did not 

 iearn it in Egypt. 



What I know will ipake many people doubt of this dodrinc of 

 ideas begetting ideas, is tue difficulty of conceiving how one imma- 

 terial fubftance fliould beget another. But the fame difficulty oc- 

 curs in the doctrine of the Trinity, according to which the Second 

 Perfon is faid to be begotten of the Firft ; and in the fame way wc 

 muft fuppofe the Third Perfon to be produced from the Second. And 

 my anfvver to the diiFiculty is, \mo^ That natural generation is as dif- 

 ficult to be accounted for, as this fpiritual generation. And even in 

 it I hold that there is a generation of the mind as well as of the 

 body : For I cannot believe that there is a new creation of a mind 

 for every body that is generated, but that the mind is continued 

 by generation, and proceeds from the mind of the parent, or pa- 

 rents, as much as the body of the offspring does. But, idly^ Every 

 man, who is a theift, mud believe that all inferior intelligences, and, in 

 general, all minds, of every kind, proceed mediately from the great 

 fource of being, and immediately from the two principles above men- 

 tioned, viz. the fecond and third perfons of rhe Trinity. We muft 

 not, however, conceive, that the iubftance, from which the fpiritual 

 offspring proceeds, is any how leffeaed or i.npaired by that produc- 

 tion; which is the cafe in the generation of body: But we muft fup- 

 pofe, that the three great principles of nature are no more Icilened 

 or impaired by all the emanations from them, than the fun appears 

 to be by the conftant emiirion of rays for fo manv thoufands of 

 years, or than a feal is by an impreffion that is made from it. And 

 what I fay of the three great principles of the univcrfc, I extend al- 

 fo to the ideas of Plato : And I fay, what Plato has faid, that, by 

 communicating thcmfelves to fuch an infinite number of things, 

 they ftill prefcrve the integrity of their natures, without being leffen- 



ed, 



