Chap. I. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 69 



of which tlie commentators upon Arlftotle fpeak fo much, by which 

 the mind pafTes from one idea to another. How inferior our minds 

 are in this refpedl to the Divine, it is needlefs to obferve. We have, 

 however, fomething of that faculty by which feveral ideas are at 

 once the fubjedl of the contemplation of our minds. It is in this 

 way that we form an idea by perceiving the one in the many, and 

 that we underftand the definition of any thing propofed to us: Nor, 

 without this faculty, could we be convinced of the truth of any fyl- 

 logifai ; for v/e muft have in our mind altogether the ideas contain- 

 ed in the premiffes, otherwife we could never give our affent to the 

 conclufion. — And thus much may fuffice to fliow the difference be- 

 twixt our intelled and the Divine, with refpedl to ideas. 



Of that difference which is betwixt the ideas of the Divine Mind 

 and of ours, that all our ideas are derived from objedls of fenfe, where- 

 as it would be grofs impieiy to (iiy that the Divine ideas originated 

 in that manner, 1 have already fpoken ; and 1 fhall only add here, 

 that, though all our ideas are derived from our fenlations, they are 

 quite different from chem, being formed by our intelledt, and not by 

 our fenl'es, of which they are not the perceptions, though thefe 

 pevceptions give rife to them. It is, therefore, the grolTell error 

 which Mr Locke has fallen into, of confounding fenfiuions and ideas, 

 and of making a whole clafs of ideas, which he calls ideas of fenfa- 

 tion. But of the difference betwixt ideas and fenfations I have faid 

 enough in the preceding volume. I will, therefore, fay nothing 

 more of ideas here, but proceed to inquire concerning that co.npari- 

 fon of our ideas, by which fcience is produced; and which Ariftotle 

 has very properly diftinguiflied, in the definition that he has given 

 us of man, from that faculty of the mind, by which our ideas are 

 formed, and" which is called by the Greeks royj, whereas fcience is 

 called e'TTta-Triu^n ; and man is veiy properly defined by him to be vw' 



