96 A N T I E N T M E T A P H Y S I C S. Book II. 



or rhat does not both comjirehend and is comprehen.!ed,that is, in other 

 words, is a wholu v^'irh refjictl to one thing, and a part with refpedl 

 to another thing; — is liich an union ot" the feveral parts of the ani- 

 verfe, as makes it a fyftem the moft perfc£t, as I have laid, that can 

 be imagined ; and yet it has not been obferved, as far as I know, by 

 any perfon who has treated of the fyftem of the univerfe, by which, 

 and which only, we can conclude tliat the univerfe is produced by 

 Supreme Intelligence. The divifion of things into gcnufcs and fpe- 

 ciefes, from which no doubt it follows, that every fpecies, and every 

 individual under that fpecies, is contained in the genus, is known to 

 every man who has learned the elements of logic. But that every 

 thing in the univerfe, which can be made the praedicate or fubjedt 

 of a propofition, contains or is contained in fome other thing, or 

 both contains and is contained, has not been attended to by any phi- 

 loiopher, antient or modern, as far as I know ; and yet it makes the 

 fvftem of the univerfe more perfect than even the divifion of things 

 into genufes and fpeciefes, as it leaves not any one thing fnigle and 

 by itfelf, "but (hows that there is nothing which is not conuc-ded 

 wifh fomerhing elfe, and by the mofl: intimate connexion poffible, 

 that of whole and part. And it is this connexion of ivbole and part 

 that makes, as I have fliown, all truth and fcience. 



What makes it the more furprifmg, that this connection of things 

 has never been thought of, is, that we daily fpeak of generals and 

 particulars : And it is evident that every thing in the univerfe 

 muft be either a general, or a particular comprehended under fomc 

 general; fo that all things in the univerfe are generals or particulars: 

 Which comes juft to what 1 have faid. that every thing in the uni- 

 verfe comprehends or is comprehended in fome other thing, or both 

 comprehends and is comprehended ; for one general idea may com- 

 prehend another Icfs general idea, and be itfelf comprehended in 

 another idea more general. 



And 



