Chap.Vr. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. in 



Thofe higheft genufcs comprehend not only the things of this 

 earth but all things in nature. If, therefore, they could not be re- 

 duced to number, the fyflem of the univerfe would be infinite, and 

 therefore, as Ihave Ihown*, truly no fyftem at all; for there can be 

 no fyftem without thofe bounds and limits which are given it by 

 number ; which, therefore, was held by the Pythagoreans to be ef- 

 fential in the fyftem of the univerfe, as giving it both order and ar- 

 rangment, together with bounds and limits. The difcovcry, there- 

 fore, of the dod:rine of the Categories, which was made in the 

 fcliool of Pythagoras, befides the other praifo that I have beftovved 

 upon it, may be faid to have made a fyftem of the univerfe which 

 was not known before. 



All thefe feveral genufes and fpecieks, contained in the Categories, 

 and even the ("ategories themfcives, end in one^ I mean the Supreme 

 Being, who contains them all. 



And here we may obferve the tendency of nature in its progrefs 

 to the one. The individuals are reduced to one in the loweft Ipe- 

 citfcs : The fpeciefes go to a greater otie^ the getius : The genus to 

 a greater one ftill ; that is to a higher genus of which it is but a 

 fpecies : And fo on from genus to genus till the progrefs ends in 

 the Categories, and they in the Supreme Being, the Author oi all 

 things in the univerfe. It, therefore, appears that Plato has very 

 well defined a general idea, fuch as a ipecies or a genus, to be otic 

 in the many; the more general the idea, the greater the number of 

 the many in it, and the more comprelienfive the one of that many, till 

 at laft we come to the one not in the many only, but //; a// : From 

 which we may fee the truth before noticed of that dodrine of antient 

 philofophy, that all things in nature are the one in the many and the 

 vinny in one "[". 



It 

 * Page 7(j. f Page 45. 



