Chap. VII. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 143 



which may be or not he ; and it is true, what Ariftotle has maintain- 

 ed, and which fhows that lie iimft have had a mofl: extenfive view 

 of nature, " that every thing pofTible (that is which dot^ not imply 

 " a contradiction, and is not inconfiftent with the general laws of 

 " nature, by which the fyftem is governed) does exift,'' as otherwife 

 the poffibillty would be to no purpofc, which is not the cafe of any of 

 the works of God, who, as he does every thing that is neceffary, 

 does nothing that is unnecefTliry or fuperfluous : And, befides, the 

 event would be a contingency, which might be or not be; fuch, as 1 

 have fald, there is not in the works of God, nor indeed can be in 

 a fyftem fo perfedl as that of the univerfe. And, indeed, to com- 

 mon fenfe it appears at firft view incredible, that, of fo many mil- 

 lions of creatures, as we may fuppofe, of imperfe£l intelledl, all 

 fhould make the proper ufe of their intelle<Sls, and not fall into er- 

 ror : But, on the other hand, it would be irreconcileable with the 

 wifdom and goodnefs of God, to fuppofe that they 'A\ fell ; for it 

 would be to fuppofe a whole fpecies of animals to be fo termed as 

 to be deftined to be miferable. The middle way, therefore, betwixt 

 thefe two extremes appears to me to be the truth. 



But It may be faid, Why did a God of infinite wifdom and good- 

 nefs produce a race of animals, of wliom fome at leaft are deftined 

 to be miferable ? And, I thmk, this obje(9:ion could not be anfwered 

 if they were deftined to be perpetually miferable. But in the 

 fequel of this work I will (how, that they are not deftined to be 

 perpetually miferable, but that they are fooner or later to be reftored 

 to their primitive ftate ; and that this reftoration is to begin even 

 in this life : And this leads me to inquire how this reftoration is 

 to be carried on, which will be the fubject of another chapter. 



CHAP. 



