Chap.I. ANTIL' NT METAPHYSICS. 295 



could not fubfift. And if the brute have not that nitelligence which 

 difcovers to man the nature of the thing, and fo enables him to form 

 the idea of any thing, much lefs has he the faculty of fcience, by 

 which ideas are compared together ; fo that the way in which Ari- 

 ftotlc has diftinguifhed a logical animal, fuch as he fays man is, 

 by the capacity of intelha atid fcience^ is perfedly juft, and ihows 

 that he underflood compleatly the difference betwixt man even in 

 his natural ftate and the other animals of this earth. 



The reader may be furprlfed that I fhould have detained him fo 

 long here upon the difference betwixt man and brute, when I have 

 faid fo much upon that fubjed in the IV. Vol. of this work, p. 14 

 and following, and more Hill in the V. Vol. Book III. Chap. XV. 

 But he fhould confider that no perfon can know what man is, that 

 is what he himfelf is, if he do not know the difference betwixt 

 man and brute, and what diftinguiflies the governing animal on this 

 earth from any other animal. The accurate knowledge therefore of 

 this difference I think is a principal part of the knowledge of man. 

 By what I have added here to the paffages above quoted I hope I 

 have faid enough to corred the common error, that intelligence and 

 rationality are the fame, and that, becaufe the brute is not an intelli- 

 gent animal, therefore he is not rational. 



CHAP. 



