5i 



8 APPENDIX. 



porated with ibe matter. And I think I have aUo proved, that not 

 only ideas of particular things exift, but alio general ideas, from 

 which, as it is moft natural, particular ideas are derived ; And iu 

 this way I have accounted for the origin of that divifion of things, 

 which is univerfal in nature, into genufes, fpeciefes, and individuals, 

 and fo have proved the univerfe to be a compleat fyftem proceeding 

 from one firfl caufe, and other caufes fubordinate to that in a re- 

 gular progreflion, down to the individual things exifting in the uni- 

 verfe ; fo that there is not any one thing in it, for the origin of 

 which we cannot account, as every thing is derived from fome other 

 thing, which is prior to it in the order of nature and has produced 

 it. And all things are fo connedcd in nature, that, as I have elfe- 

 v/here faid*, there is nothing exiiling, that does not contain or is not 

 contained in fome other thing ; and what makes ftill a more won- 

 derful connexion is, that every thing both contains, and is contain- 

 ed, in fome other thing. 



It may feem furprifing to many of my readers that I fhould mul- 

 tiply fo much the caufes of things in the univerfe, and divide them 

 into caufes principal and fubordinate, when we may fuppofe the 

 firft caufe producing every thing immediately by a Jtat. But we 

 fhould coufidcr that the firft caufe is fupreme not only in power but 

 in intelligence, which is fo effential to his nature that we cannot, 

 conceive a Supreme Being without intelligence. Now intelligence 

 mud a£t regularly and in order, and proceed from one thing to ano- 

 ther ; and accordingly God has not produced every thing imme- 

 diately from himfelf, but by the intervention of the other two per- 

 fons of the Trinity, the Son and the Holy Spirit. By the firft of 

 thefe he has produced that intelligence, which we fee is predomi- 

 nant in the univerfe, and all the inferior intelligences in it ; and 

 among other things that are derived from this principle of intelli- 

 gence, I reckon that divifion of things into genufes and fpeciefes, 



without 



• See p 331. 



