350 APPENDIX. 



fmply and abfolutely in itfelf, as our fenfcs do, but in relation to 

 ether things and as one of feveral things. This diftindlion betwixt 

 intellect and fenfe I have elfewhere explained * : And it fhows 

 dearly that it is only by intelledl that we are enabled to form any 

 idea of the fyftem of the univerfe, or of any other fyftem ; and, unlefs 

 we can perceive a fyftem, or a whole^ in things, we cannot, as 1 have 

 elfewhere fhown f , have any idea of the beautiful^ the fource, as I 

 have faid j:, both of virtue and religion. 



And thus it appears that the operations of our intelled, in per- 

 ceiving the one in the many, are perfedily fuitable to the nature of 

 things, fince nothing exifts but as one oi feveral or many things. 

 And thir. operation of our intelle£t naturally leads us to inquire, Whe- 

 ther there be not, not only one in the many, but one in all, that is 

 the Supreme Being ? and Whether the univerfe, which he has pro- 

 duced, be not a fyftem of very many things, all connected together, 

 as things muft be in every fyftem, fo that the univerfe is one in 

 the many as well as its great Author ? And, as our intelledl natu- 

 rally leads to thefe fublime fpeculations, which if well condu<Sted> 

 muft make the greateft happinefs of an intellectual being, we fhould 

 be very thankful to God, for having beftowed upon us fuch a fa- 

 culty. 



I will conclude this long work by adding to it, by way of epi- 

 logue, an apology, which many of my readers may think neceflary, 

 for the faults I have found with the philofophy of Mr Locke in his 

 EfTay on the Human Underftanding, which is the only fyftem of 

 logic we have in Englifti, and with the philofophy of a much greater 

 author. Sir Ifaac Newton, where he fays, that body being once put 



in 



* P. 345 of this Vol. 



-)■ Ibid. p. 272. 



X Ibid. p. 274 and following. 



