268 THE USE BOOK. 



The Federal Constitution delegates to Congress, absolutely 

 and without limitations, the general power to dispose of and 

 make all needful rules and regulations concerning the public 

 land, whether it be situated in a State or in a Territory. 

 (Irvine v. Marshall, 20 How., 558; Jourdan v. Barrett, 4 How., 

 169; United States v. Gratiot, 14 Pet., 526, 538; Gibson v. Chou- 

 teau, 13 Wall., 99.) The exercise of that power can not be re- 

 stricted or embarrassed in any degree by State legislation. 

 This is the effect of the constitutional provision, unaided by 

 the special provision usually incorporated in the compact by 

 which the States are admitted into the Union. The provision 

 in the constitution of Montana, under which that State was ad- 

 mitted, declares " that the people of the proposed State of Mon- 

 tana do agree and declare that they forever disclaim all right 

 and title to the unappropriated public lands lying within the 

 boundaries thereof." The appellant contends that the portion of 

 the ordinance just quoted is limited by the remainder thereof, 

 which follows : "And to all lands lying within said limits owned 

 or held by any Indian or Indian tribes, and until the title 

 thereto shall have been extinguished by the United States, the 

 same shall be and remain subject to the disposition of the 

 United States, and said Indian lands shall remain under the ab- 

 solute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United 

 States." It is argued that from this latter provision, expressly 

 acknowledging that the Indian land shall remain under the ab- 

 solute jurisdiction and control of Congress, it was not the in- 

 tention that other lands should be subject to such jurisdiction 

 and control. But it is wholly unnecessary to enter into a dis- 

 cussion of the construction of this provision of the constitution 

 of the State of Montana. Congress had not the power to re- 

 linquish any of its jurisdiction over the public domain by any 

 compact with that State, nor had that State the power to re- 

 serve any such control. 



It is true that in Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan et al. (3 How., 

 212-223), concerning the powers vested in the State of Alabama 

 on her admission into the Union, the following language was 

 used in the opinion of the majority of the court : " Nothing re- 

 mained to the United States, according to the terms of the agree- 

 ment, but the public lands. And if an express stipulation had 

 been inserted in the agreement granting the municipal right of 

 sovereignty and eminent domain to the United States, such 

 stipulation would have been void and inoperative, because the 

 United States have no constitutional capacity to exercise muni- 

 cipal jurisdiction, sovereignty, or eminent domain within the 

 limits of a State or elsewhere, except in the cases in which it is 

 expressly granted." But the doctrine so announced that the 



