THE USE BOOK. 277 



of a permit under the act approved June 4, 1897 (30 Stat., 35), 

 which authorized the Secretary of the Interior to 



Make such rules and regulations and establish such serv- 

 ice as will insure the objects of such reservations, namely, 

 to regulate their occupancy and use and to prevent the for- 

 ests thereon from destruction. 



[425] It will be observed that neither of these acts conferred 

 upon the Secretary of the Interior expressly any authority to 

 make a charge of any kind as a condition of granting the per- 

 mits which they respectively authorized. It was held, however, 

 by Attorney-General Moody that such authority was implied in 

 the power conferred upon the Secretary by the act of 1S97 to 

 grant or refuse the permits, in his discretion, and the act of 1905 

 was referred to as substantially a legislative recognition of this 

 authority on his part. If, however, the act of 1897 conferred 

 upon the Secretary of the Interior and, therefore, afterwards, 

 upon the Secretary of Agriculture the authority, in his discre- 

 tion, to require payment of a reasonable charge as a condition 

 of issuing any such permits as are authorized by the said act, it 

 seems to me quite clear that the act of 1901, above quoted, con- 

 veys the like authority. The language of the later act appears 

 to me more explicit than that of the former, and the intention 

 of the Congress to leave the privileges granted under that act 

 revocable in the discretion of the Secretary, as is expressly 

 stated in the last proviso, above quoted, of the act of 1901, seems 

 to be more nearly consonant with a purpose to intrust to his dis- 

 cretion all matters connected with the granting of such permits 

 than is any relevant provision to be found in the act of 1897. I 

 conclude, therefore, that you are authorized by the act of 1901 to 

 make the granting of permits for the purposes contemplated by 

 that act dependent upon the payment, by the persons receiving 

 such permits, of such charges as you may deem reasonable for 

 the purposes contemplated by the law. 



Whether charges based upon the three grounds specifically 

 enumerated in your letter requesting an opinion would or would 

 not be reasonable is not, under the circumstances of this case, a 

 question proper to be determined by this Department, but a 

 matter left by the law entirely to your discretion. In Riverside 

 Oil Company v. Hitchcock (190 U. S., 325), referred to in the 

 opinion of Attorney-General Moody, above quoted, the court 

 says : " The responsibility, as well as the power, rests with the 

 Secretary, uncontrolled by the courts." This would seem to be 

 no less true as to the question presented in the present case. 



[426] It may be well for me to say, however, that I do not 

 think it. clear, as seems to be assumed in some of the papers for- 



