32 



can any one say of it ? since it is always changing and flow- 

 ing, and is not naturally adapted to abide for a moment. 

 But that which is celestial, in consequence of being remote 

 from us, is not easily known, nor can it be apprehended by 

 science, but we must be satisfied in the theory of it with 

 an approximation to the truth, and with probability [instead 

 of certainty]. For everything which is in place requires 

 the being situated there, in order to a perfect knowledge of 

 its nature. The intelligible, however, is not a thing of this 

 kind, since it is not apprehended by us in place ; for, where- 

 ever any one establishes his reasoning energy, there, truth 

 being everywhere present, he comes into contact with it. 

 But if it is possible to assert anything firm and stable about 

 that which is celestial, this also is possible, so far as it par- 

 ticipates of being, and so far as it can be apprehended by 

 intelligence. For, if anything necessary can be collected 

 concerning it, it is alone through geometrical demonstra- 

 tions which are universal. But so far as it is sensible, it is 

 difficult to be apprehended, and difficult to be surveyed." 

 See the first volume of my translation of Proclus on the 

 Timaeus of Plato, p. 291. 



In p. 293, he also observes, " that perfectly accurate ar- 

 guments, and such as are truly scientific, are not to be ex- 

 pected in physical discussions, but such as are assimilated to 

 them. It is besides this requisite to know, that as the world 

 is mingled from physical powers, and an intellectual and 

 divine essence; for "physical works, as the [Chaldean] Oracle 

 says, co-subsist with the intellectual light of the father ;" 

 thus, also, the discussion of the world makes a commixture 

 of faith and truth. For things which are assumed from 

 sense participate largely of conjectural discussion; but 

 things which commence from intelligibles, possess that 

 which is irreprehensible, and cannot be confuted." And, 



