FINAL ACT OF SECOND PAN AMERICAN SCIENTIFIC CONGRESS. 117 



(6) By Chief Justice MARSHALL in the case of The Antelope (reported 

 in 10 Wheaton's Reports, pp. 66, 122), decided by the Supreme Court 

 of the United States in 1825, who said: "No principle of general law is 

 more universally acknowledged than the perfect equality of nations. 

 Russia and Geneva have equal rights. It results from this equality that 

 no one can rightfully impose a rule on another. Bach legislates for 

 itself, but its legislation can operate on itself alone." 



(c) By the Honorable BLIHU ROOT, in his address before the Third 

 Pan American Conference held at Rio Janeiro on July 31, 1906. 



(d) By BELLO in his Principios de Derecho de Jentes, pt. i , ch. i , sec. 7, and 



(e) By CALVO in his Droit International Theorique et Pratique, 5th ed., 

 vol. i, sec. 208. 



IV. Every Nation has the right to territory within defined boundaries, 



and to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over its territory, and all 

 persons whether native or foreign found therein. 



This right and duty are, according to the official commentary, to be 

 undei stood in the sense in which they were interpreted by Chief Justice 

 MARSHALL in the case of the schooner Exchange (reported in 7 Cranch's 

 Reports, pp. 116, 136137), decided by the Supreme Court of the United 

 States in 1812, who said: 



The jurisdiction of the nation, within its own territory, is necessarily 

 exclusive and absolute; it is susceptible of no limitation, not imposed by 

 itself. * * * 



A nation would justly be considered as violating its faith, although that 

 faith might not be expressly plighted, which should suddenly and without 

 previous notice exercise its territorial powers in a manner not consonant 

 to the usages and received obligations of the civilized world. 



V. Every nation entitled to a right by the law of nations is entitled to 



have that right respected and protected by all other nations, for 

 right and duty are correlative, and the right of one is the duty of 

 all to observe. 



This right is to be understood in the sense in which it was stated and 

 denned by Chief Justice WAITE in the case of United States v. Arjona 

 (reported in 120 United States Reports, pp. 479, 487), decided by the 

 Supreme Court of the United States in 1886, who said: 



But if the United States can require this of another, that other may 

 require it of them, because international obligations are of necessity 

 reciprocal in their nature. The right, if it exists at all, is given by the law 

 of nations, and what is law for one is, under the same circumstances, law 

 for the other. A right secured by the law of nations to a nation, or its 

 people, is one the United States as the representatives of this nation are 

 bound to protect. 



