THE DISCOVERY OF TAWS 50 



it is not merely that I have more knowledge of it, but 

 that the knowledge is of a different kind. It is utterly 

 impossible that I should have of the one event the 

 kind of knowledge which I have of the other. If we 

 are to discuss profitably the problem before us, we must 

 remember this difference. We must not seek of events 

 which have not happened, the kind of knowledge appli- 

 cable only to those which have happened. And again, 

 we must not seek the kind of knowledge it is once more 

 a different kind that w r e have of purely logical or 

 internal propositions. When I say that a black cat 

 is black, I am quite certain that the statement is true 

 because by " a black cat " I mean a cat that is black ; 

 to say that a black cat is not black is not untrue ; it 

 is meaningless. The knowledge that I have of the 

 truth of the statement is necessarily different from that 

 which I can have of the statement that there is such a 

 thing as a black cat 01 that all cats are black ; and the 

 difference is once more in the kind of knowledge and 

 arises from a difference in the kind of statement ; it is 

 not a difference in degree of certainty. 



The problem would be expressed better if w r e merely 

 compared our knowledge of various future events and 

 :iy we are more certain that some will happen 

 that others happen and how we arrive at this 

 superior knowledge, for then we are sure of comparing 

 vledge of the same kind. Of some future 

 .ts we are as certain as we can be in respect of know- 

 ledge of tliis kind ; we arc as cert a r can be that 

 the sun will rise to-morrow. It would be ridiculous to 

 say that we are not certain because we do not feel towards 

 prediction the same mental attitude fc] feel 

 towards the assertion that the sun day or the asser- 



v is not to-morrow. For, once more, 

 the ice in itude necessarily arises 



ICC in the nature f the statements. 



