THE EXPLANATION OF LAWS 79 



instance of general and fundamental principles. It is 

 one of the profoundest instincts of our intellectual nature 

 to regard the more general principle as the more ultimately 

 acceptable and satisfactory ; it is this instinct which led 

 men first to the studies that have developed into science. 

 In fact, what was called in the last chapter the 

 " ordering " of experience by means of laws might equally 

 well have been called the explanation of that experience, 

 s explain our experience because they order it by 

 referring particular instances to general principles ; the 

 explanation will be the more satisfactory the more general 

 principle, and the greater the number of particular 

 .nces that can be referred to it. Thus, we shall feel 

 that the bursting of the pipes is explained more satis- 

 factorily when it is pointed out that the expansion of 

 water when converted into ice explains also other 

 :non experience, for instance that a layer of ice 

 forms first on the top of a pond and not on the bottom. 

 Doubtless there are other kinds of explanation ; but 

 important for our purpose to notice that the explana- 

 of common life often depend on these two principles 

 that ideas are more satisfactory when they are more 

 .iar and also when they are more general ; and that 

 r of these principles may be made the basis of an 

 i nation. 



When it is asked v the nature of the scientific 



explanation of laws and it is the purpose of this chapter 



to an^wi T that question it is usually replied that it is 



of the second kind, and that laws are explained by 



beini. to be j ;>les of more general 



On this view the explanation of laws is merely an 



process involved in the formulation of 



ly a progress from the less to the n 



some stage, of course, the process must 



/timatel' ^o general will 1 



being at bey cannot be in< l;i<K\l under 



