TIffi 



EXPLANATION OF LAWS 91 



or theories and not laws as the product of the internal 



world of the intellect. For both theories and laws derive 



their ultimate value from their concordance with nature 



and both arise from mental processes of the same kind. 



Moreover, as has been suggested already, in the more 



highly developed sciences of to-day theories play a very 



large part in determining laws ; they not only suggest 



laws which are subsequently confirmed by experimental 



investigation, but they also decide whether suggested 



are or are not to be accepted. For, as our discussion 



in the previous chapter showed, experiment alone cannot 



decide with perfect definiteness whether or no a law is 



to be accepted ; there are always loopholes left which 



>le us to reject a law, however much experimental 



evidence may suggest it and enable us to maintain a law 



(slightly modified) even when experimental evidence seems 



to contradict it. An examination of any actual 



:ce mil show that the acceptance of a law is very 



larg< i mined by the possibility of explaining it 



by means of a theory ; if it can be so explained, \ve are 



much more ready to accept it and much more anxious 



to maintain it than we should be if it were not the conse- 



ce of some theory. Indeed many laws in science are 



and regarded with a certain amount 



inquire we find that an empirical law 



h no theoretical explanation is known. 



In the science of physics at least, it would almost be n 



accurate to say that we believe our laws because they 



our theories than to say that \u l>rlu \ < 

 ries because they pivdict and explain n 

 On such ground vu\\ ( though it is generally 



are any less tin: product ^ina- 



tive :, I problem why n.- 



i s clearly 

 ' is doub 



more 



