86 COALFIELDS AXD COLLIERIES OF AUSTRALIA. 



be reconciled, not only for the present, but also for the future. 

 The average capacity of all the collieries was greater than the 

 average demand, and naturally the most difficult matter to 

 settle was the proportion each mine should contribute. If in 

 the proportion of the average output of each mine for the 

 previous three years, it placed those mines at a disadvantage 

 which were being developed and were rapidly building up a 

 trade, when compared with older established mines ; so a 

 certain readjustment was necessary. Provision was made for 

 penalties to be paid by those companies who exceeded their 

 allotted output, the sum thus obtained to be paid into a 

 common fund, and the money so accumulated used to com- 

 pensate the owners of those mines who failed to get orders 

 for the tonnage allotted to them. Though the agreement can- 

 not be signed, as it is probably contrary to the provisions of 

 the Commonwealth Anti-Trust law, still the parties consider 

 themselves honorably bound to respect the arrangement, and 

 funds have been contributed to guarantee their observance. 

 As the coal from the various collieries is not of the same- 

 quality, three classes are recognised. The first grade coal at 

 the commencement of 190T had a standard selling price of 

 10s. Tier ton. All the Maitland mines, except one, and all 

 the Newcastle mines, except two, yield first grade coal. The 

 second grade coal has a standard selling price of 9s. 3d. per 

 ton. The third grade coal, which conies from the Teralba 

 mines, is valued at 3s. or 4s. less than the Newcastle coal. 

 The rates of compensation and penalty varies according to the 

 classification from 4s. per ton downwards. 



By an agreement of this sort, individual competition be- 

 tween mines in the same district is lessened, and this enables 

 the mine-owners to demand a price, within limits, that will 

 give a fair interest on the outlay. For oversea coal there is 

 always foreign competition to be taken into consideration, 

 while for home consumption the product from other Aus- 

 tralian coal-fields will tend to keep prices within bounds. So 

 long as members of the vend can supply more than the 

 demand, it is naturally to their advantage to suppress com- 

 petition by those outside their ring; this they can easily do 

 if they exercise the power at their command by underselling 

 a competitor. Thus by selecting certain collieries to supply 

 coal of a similar quality at two or three shillings less than 

 the tender of the company they wish to fight, the other 

 members of the vend can make up the difference to their 

 friends, who secure the tender, from a general fund, to be 

 maintained by levies of so much per ton. In this way a loss 

 becomes light to the combine, which might ruin a single 

 company. To control the vend, boards are established, both 

 in Newcastle (N.S.W.) and London. In the past, prac- 



