ioo THE JUKES. 



set down at about 26 per cent, when an actual examination shows 

 conclusively that the total for all crimes 1575.63 per cent; for 

 crimes against person it is 59.52 per cent, and for those against 

 property 79 per cent. Thus it turns out that in the crimes of 

 design, which require training to insure success, and upon which 

 the offender depends for his living, the proportion of habitual crim- 

 inals is 19.48 per cent greater than in crimes of impulse. 



With certain political economists, it has become customary to 

 assert that crime does not pay. The main point relied on to sustain 

 their view is that, on the average, the net booty obtained by crime 

 is less than the average rate of wages, that criminals are subject to 

 frequent imprisonment, and that they forfeit the advantages of the 

 good opinion of their neighbors. All these positions are true if 

 they were predicated of reputable people who are sensitive of their 

 good name ; but they are not true when affirmed of habitual crimi- 

 nals. As to the good opinion of the righteous, that is a negative 

 advantage which sinks to a level of absolute insignificance in the 

 estimation of a clever pickpocket. The " habituals " have a com- 

 munity of their own ; they seek for the approbation of this circle 

 and not that of the philanthropists and divines, whose code of 

 propriety is incomprehensible to them and not unfrequently a 

 subject of derision. 



We must also dispossess ourselves of the idea that crime does 

 not pay. In reality there are three classes with whom it does : ist. 

 The experts, who commit crimes which are difficult to detect or who 

 can buy themselves off. These are the aristocrats of the profession. 

 2d. The incompetent, who are too lazy to work and too proud to beg, 

 or too young for the poor-house. 3d. The pauper, who steals be- 

 cause prison fare and prison companionship offer higher inducements 

 than poor-house fare or poor-house society. This stock amounts to 

 22.31 per cent of all criminals, as seen by table XII. The whole 

 problem, so far as these three classes are concerned, resolves itself 

 into the economic axiom of relative efficiency. The question with 

 them is not : Does crime yield a rate of income less than that of a 

 skilled mechanic ? But, does it yield a rate higher than any employer 

 would be willing to pay for an inefficient, careless and untrained 



