142 



CONGRESS, UNITED STATES. 



cognizance of suits between citizens of the same State. 

 Nor shall any such suit between such a corporation 

 and a citizen or citizens of a State in which it may be 

 doing business be removed to any circuit court of the 

 United States, except in like cases in which such re- 

 moval is authorized by the foregoing provision hi suits 

 between citizens of the same State. 



"That is to say, in a case such as is here 

 named the corporation would, for the purposes 

 of that suit, be deemed to be a citizen of the 

 State in which it had been carrying on busi- 

 ness, and of which the defendant was a citi- 

 zen. I can not doubt but this provision will 

 commend itself to all. Gentlemen will see 

 that this is of the utmost importance to fair 

 dealing and an impartial administration of jus- 

 tice. It will have the effect to make all kinds 

 of corporations careful to contract fairly and 

 squarely with the people. I say it will tend 

 to the impartial administration of justice also, 

 because the corporation, having found it to be 

 the best policy to take no unconscionable ad- 

 vantage of the citizen in the beginning, will 

 not regard it necessary to have unfair advan- 

 tage upon the trial in order that it may secure 

 a just finding or verdict, and the people there- 

 after having been dealt with honorably in the 

 main by corporations, and having equal ad- 

 vantages in the forum of trial, will rapidly 

 diveat themselves of the bias and prejudice 

 no\v so strong against corporations. 



" Mr. Speaker, I do not believe there can be 

 any serious doubt as to the constitutionality of 

 that part of the bill which I have just quoted. 

 I know, sir, that the Supreme Court has held 

 that a corporation was a citizen of the State 

 that created it, and therefore within the clause 

 of the Constitution which extends the judicial 

 power of the Federal courts to controversies 

 between citizens of different States. But it 

 does not follow by any means that Congress 

 may not constitutionally require a corporation 

 organized under the laws of any State to sue 

 in the State courts, under the circumstances 

 named in that part of the bill which I have 

 just read. With as much and more plausibil- 

 ity, reason, and force might it be said that that 

 part of section 11 of the act of 1789 is uncon- 

 stitutional, which provided that no district or 

 circuit court of the United States should have 

 cognizance of any suit to recover the contents 

 of any promissory note or other chose in ac- 

 tion in favor of an assignee, unless suit might 

 have been prosecuted in such court to recover 

 thereon if no assignment had been made." 



Mr. Philips, of Missouri: "In the very lim- 

 ited time allotted to me, I shall not attempt to 

 speak of the general provisions of this bill ; and 

 I should not have obtruded any remarks upon 

 the House at so early a period after my entry 

 into it but for the experience I have had under 

 the administration of this law of 1875. Its 

 general purpose has my unqualified sympathy, 

 for it strikes at an evil in the administration of 

 justice which no man not fresh from the prac- 

 tice of the law can fully appreciate. Step by 

 step has the jurisdiction of the Federal courts 



been extended by positive statutory enactment 

 and the construction of the judge on the bench, 

 until these courts have in a large measure taken 

 to themselves the control and trial of cases 

 which in the opinion of the statesmen and ju- 

 rists of the best epoch of the republic belonged 

 exclusively to the domestic courts of the States. 

 ' This ravenous expilation of the State ' has 

 been accomplished by an insidious process, 

 silent in its operations, stealthy in its approach, 

 and most dangerous in its tendency ; for a 

 more cunning and surreptitious method of tak- 

 ing from the citizen his self-government could 

 scarcely be devised. A more effectual instru- 

 mentality of despoiling the weak and the timid, 

 and oppressing the poor man, could scarcely 

 suggest itself to the most selfish of govern- 

 ments. The practitioner who a few years ago 

 brought and tried his causes in his home 

 courts, with whose methods of procedure he 

 and his clients were familiar, where he tried 

 his causes before a jury of the vicinage, where 

 the common law and the Bill of Rights gave 

 him a right to be heard, to-day, in the pursuit of 

 his causes, is dragged hundreds of miles from 

 his home to try his cases before a jury who are 

 strangers to him, where the litigant does not 

 get the benefit of his good character, and, 

 while often before judges who are most accom- 

 plished jurists and who administer the laws 

 with impartiality, he too frequently finds him- 

 self before judges on the bench who, something 

 like the heathen, are a law unto themselves. 



"Such was the holding of the Supreme 

 Court in its early history ; and the majority of 

 the present Supreme Court are struggling to 

 bring back the law to its original foundation. 

 I beg for one moment to call the attention of 

 the House to two or three decisions of the Su- 

 preme Court, for the purpose of showing that 

 the amendment offered by the gentleman from 

 Texas [Mr. Culberson] is no innovation upon 

 the Constitution, and in no manner interferes 

 with the rightful jurisdiction of the United 

 States circuit courts, but is in accord with the 

 earlier and the later decisions of the Supreme 

 Court. In the case of Cohens against Virginia, 

 6 Wheaton, decided by Chief-Justice Marshall, 

 the following language is used : 



" A case may truly be said to arise under the Con- 

 stitution or a law of the United States whenever its 

 correct decision depends upon the construction of 

 either. The title or right set up by a party may be 

 defeated by one construction of the Constitution or 

 law of the United States, or sustained by an opposite 

 construction. In either of these cases the jurisdiction 

 of the Federal court may rightfully attach. 



" In G. W. & W. Co. vs. Keyes, 6 Otto, a 

 majority of the present Supreme Court say : 



" A cause can not be removed from a State court 

 simply because in the progress of the litigation it may 

 become necessary to give a construction to the Con- 

 stitution or a law of the United States. The decision 

 of the case must depend upon that construction ; the 

 suit must, in part, at least, arise out of a controversy 

 between the parties in regard to the operation and 

 effect of the Constitution or the law upon the facts in- 

 volved. 



