BALANCE OF POWER. 



B 



BALANCE OF POWER. In tlie modern Euro- 

 pean acceptation of the term, the balance of 

 power is a mutual understanding among sover- 

 eign states that no one state may interfere 

 with the independence of any other state. In 

 this may perhaps be found the germ of that 

 congress of nations to which many thoughtful 

 minds look forward as the ultimate arbiter 

 that shall render possible the disarmament of 

 Europe. Neither the phrase itself nor the 

 idea from which it springs, is of recent ori- 

 gin. The small states of ancient Greece com- 

 bined first against the threatening domination 

 of Athens and afterward against that of Sparta. 

 More recently Europe, with show of systematic 

 organization, combined to resist the aggressions 

 of Spain, then against France, and still more 

 recently against Russia. Most of the wars 

 resulting from these combinations have proba- 

 bly tended to the establishment of international 

 law and to the advancement of human liberty. 

 Upon the whole, while the balance of power 

 has perpetuated in Europe some of the relics 

 of medieval barbarism, it has tended to pre- 

 serve a certain international equilibrium, which 

 has probably prevented many wars, and has 

 certainly preserved the autonomy of many of 

 the lesser powers. 



Conspicuous among the advocates of the 

 balance of power is the Chevalier Friedrich 

 Von Gentz (1764-1832). As head secretary 

 at the Congress of Vienna and at the Conference 

 of Ministers at Paris in 1815, he had abundant 

 opportunities to study the opinions of leading 

 European diplomatists. In 1806, while Europe 

 was well-nigh subjugated by Napoleon, he 

 published "Fragments upon the Balance of 

 Power in Europe." He defines the term as 

 ' a constitution subsisting between neighboring 

 states more or less connected with one another, 

 by virtue of which no one among them can 

 injure the independence or essential rights of 

 another, without meeting with effectual resist- 

 ance on some side, and consequently exposing 

 itself to danger." His fundamental proposi- 

 tions are: 1. No state must ever become so 

 powerful as to coerce all the rest; 2. Every 

 state that infringes the conditions is liable to 

 to be coerced by the others ; 3. The fear of 

 coercion should keep all within the bounds of 

 moderation ; 4. A state that attains a degree 

 of power adequate to defy the union should be 

 treated as a common enemy. 



Ferdinand III, Emperor of Germany is be- 

 lieved to have conceived the idea of a European 

 Congress in 1640, with a view to terminating 

 the Thirty Years' War and reconciling the 

 hostile interests of church and state. After 

 protracted negotiations the Congress of Miin- 

 ster or Westphalia assembled (July, 1643), the 

 Catholics and Protestants being represented by 



their respective delegates, while France, Swe- 

 den, Venice, and the Pope were represented 

 as mediators by embassadors. The negotiations 

 extended over a period of five years, for it was 

 not until October, 1648, that the treaty was 

 signed. It is remarkable that such apparently 

 hopeless differences could be reconciled at all, 

 but the Treaty of Westphalia proved to be for 

 Europe almost what Magna Charta was to 

 England. It was in effect the first official rec- 

 ognition of interdependent rights among rival 

 European interests. In other words, it inau- 

 gurated a balance of power. France and Swe- 

 den were appointed mediators, with the right 

 of intervention in case of need to uphold the 

 provisions of the treaty, and the hostile relig- 

 ious sects within the borders of Germany 

 were guaranteed independence, while they 

 were bound over to keep the peace. To Car- 

 dinal Mazarin was due the main feature of this 

 compact, and although the unity and autono- 

 my of Germany were injuriously curtailed, and 

 French aggression was proportionately encour- 

 aged, the treaty was substantially recognized 

 and enforced down to the time of the French 

 Revolution. 



Nevertheless, peace was not secured to 

 Europe by the treaty. The ambitions of Louis 

 XIV led to minor wars of conquest, and finally 

 to a disastrous attempt at the forcible annexa- 

 tion of Spain, with a view to uniting the two 

 kingdoms under Bourbon rule. The crisis had 

 been foreseen, and an attempt was made to 

 preserve the balance of power by an equable 

 partition of the Spanish dominions. Such an 

 arrangement was not at all to the taste of the 

 aggressive Louis XIV. who, as has indeed been 

 the case with almost all monarchs in all time, 

 did not hesitate to break through such a flimsy 

 barrier as a mere parchment treaty. His at- 

 tempt to place his grandson upon the Spanish 

 throne revived the question of the balance of 

 power. It w-as evident that the union ot' 

 France and Spain would be fatal to the exist- 

 ing schemes of dependence and independence. 

 Among the disastrous consequences antici- 

 pated was the restoration of the Stuarts in 

 England and the inevitable ascendency of the 

 Catholics all over Europe. England, Austria, 

 and Holland, therefore, the three great Prot- 

 estant powers of the period, with others of the 

 lesser states, formed a coalition against Louis, 

 and the war continued until 1715, when un- 

 der the Treaty of Utrecht the relations of all the 

 European states were carefully readjusted, 

 Philip V retaining the Spanish crown, and 

 every precaution being taken to prevent a 

 possible union of France and Spain under 

 one sovereign, since such a union would at 

 once destroy the equilibrium. Although these 

 elaborate provisions failed effectually to dis- 



