CHINA. 



regime. In Mongolia, too, Russian enterprise, 

 hand in hand with Russian political control, was 

 making similar progress. 



The Japanese Government was not blind to the 

 inevitable destiny of the northern dominions of 

 the Chinese Empire and understood the protecto- 

 rate actually exercised by Russia, and was seeking 

 to consolidate its own position in Korea by simi- 

 lar methods. Japan, wishing to gain time, and 

 Great Britain, anxious to hem back the Russians 

 until British interests are more firmly established 

 in central China, supported by the United States, 

 which has had considerable trade in Manchuria, 

 chose to ignore the actual status of the province 

 and consider that it was not even pledged to Rus- 

 sia, when it was really delivered and held, the 

 previous arrangements between the Russian and 

 Chinese governments being secret. English 

 statesmen assumed that the Anglo-German agree- 

 ment was intended to avert the Russian annexa- 

 tion of Manchuria, but the German Chancellor 

 repudiated the suggestion. Russia, w r hose an- 

 nexations in the East are as far as possible 

 gradual and pacific, w r as quite willing to agree to 

 the fiction, and intended to restore the nominal 

 sovereignty to the Chinese Emperor. An agree- 

 ment between Gen. Korostovich, representing Ad- 

 miral Alexeieff, the Russian coimnander-in-chief, 

 and Tseng, the Tartar general at Mukden, pro- 

 vided for the resumption of the civil administra- 

 tion by the Chinese authorities subject to the 

 control of a Russian resident, and for the organi- 

 zation of Chinese police under the Tartar general, 

 could call on the aid of the Russian military when 

 necessary, but must disband all Chinese soldiery 

 and deliver over all munitions of -war to the 

 Russians. The English Government, learning of 

 this secret agreement from newspaper reports, 

 asked at St. Petersburg for explanations. Other 

 versions were given or other agreements unearthed. 

 A second agreement provided for the maintenance 

 of a Chinese army in Manchuria after the comple- 

 tion of the railroad, Russia to be consulted as to 

 its strength ; allowed Russia to extend the railroad 

 in the direction of Pekin as far as the Great Wall; 

 and restrained China from granting railroad or 

 other concessions or even building railroads, not 

 alone in Manchuria, but in Mongolia, Hi, Kash- 

 garia, Yarkand, and Khotan without the permis- 

 sion of Russia. Count Lamsdorff explained that 

 the first agreement was a temporary arrangement 

 made by the military authorities for the duration 

 of the simultaneous* presence of the Russian and 

 Chinese authorities in Manchuria, and that this 

 modus vivendi must be followed before evacuation 

 by a permanent agreement with the Chinese 

 Government, not ceding territory or confer- 

 ring an actual or a virtual protectorate, but 

 giving an effective guarantee against the recur- 

 rence of an attack on the Russian frontier or the 

 destruction of the railroad. The Japanese Gov- 

 ernment took a more strenuous course in oppos- 

 ing the Manchurian agreement than the British or 

 American governments. Japanese naval forces 

 were mobilized and despatched to Korea. The 

 Germans could not understand the attitude of 

 England and the appeal to the Anglo-German 

 agreement of Oct. 16, 1900, as in framing that 

 agreement it was explained by the English as w r ell 

 as the German negotiators "that its guarantees 

 could not extend to Manchuria, England having, 

 by a previous understanding with Russia, con- 

 ceded, even more explicitly than Germany had 

 done, that Manchuria was outside of her political 

 and commercial sphere. The trading rights in 

 Manchuria, as in other parts of China, secured to 

 all the powers by the treaty of Tientsin, Russia 



had already repeatedly promised to respect. The 

 position taken by (Jreal liritain resolved itself 

 into the argument that China would impair her 

 ability to pay indemnities by yielding up any part 

 of her sovereignty in Manchuria. .Japan appealed 

 to the Anglo-German agreement promising active 

 measures for the preservation of the integrity of 

 the Chinese Empire or anti-Russian measures in 

 its dismemberment. Japan in accepting that 

 agreement stated that she did so as a cosi^na- 

 tory, and the Japanese Prime Minister now" ex- 

 plained that the express provisions of the. agree- 

 ment were the ones that Japan adopted, and it 

 did not concern her if other powers interpreted 

 it by a strange code of their own. 



The United States Government appealed to the 

 international understanding existing regarding 

 the preservation of the territorial integrity of 

 China, all the powers having assented to this prin- 

 ciple as laid down in the American circular note 

 of July 3, 1900. In a memorandum given to the 

 Chinese minister on Feb. 19 and communicated to 

 the powers on March 1, 1901, Secretary Hay stated 

 the opinion that it would be improper, inexpedi- 

 ent, and dangerous for China to make arrange- 

 ments or to consider any proposition of a private 

 nature involving the surrender of territory or 

 financial obligations by convention with any par- 

 ticular power, at least without the knowledge and 

 approval of all the powers engaged in joint ne- 

 gotiation. In answer to Japanese inquiries Rus- 

 sia declined to discuss with a third power the 

 terms of the agreement pending negotiations, but 

 promised to publish it when concluded, and would 

 consider any representations that Japan might 

 make, as the agreement was not intended to im- 

 pair China's sovereignty or to injure the interests 

 or rights of other states. 



When the second agreement came to the notice 

 of the British Government Lord Lansdowne de- 

 tected in it the virtual establishment of a pro- 

 tectorate over Chinese Turkestan and Mongolia 

 as well as over Manchuria. Count Lamsdorff said 

 that negotiations were pending, the subject of 

 which could not be disclosed, as such a course 

 would be incompatible with the character of one 

 independent state negotiating with another. 

 Japan and the United States both represented to 

 the Chinese Government through the plenipoten- 

 tiaries at Pekin that it would be inadvisable to 

 sign a separate convention regarding Manchuria 

 while peace negotiations were still proceeding, and 

 both sounded the other powers, all of which took 

 the same view, even France and Germany. Eng- 

 land, Germany, Austria, and Italy offered the 

 same counsel to China. Japan notified China 

 that if Russia obtained any territorial or com- 

 mercial advantages Japan would require equiva- 

 lent advantages. Even Russia concurred in a 

 memorandum from Washington against secret ar- 

 rangements with any one power without the agree- 

 ment of all while negotiations were going on, but 

 assumed that it did not apply to a temporary mili- 

 tary arrangement. Other conditions that Russia 

 sought to weave into the agreement were that 

 the appointment of the Tartar general in each of 

 the three provinces of Manchuria should be sub- 

 ject to the approval of Russia, a right that Russia 

 already exercised; that a Russian official should 

 control the police in each province; and that the 

 frontier customs should be under Russian control, 

 and transit for goods imported from Siberia 

 should be free throughout the interior. Although 

 the Russian Government refused to disclose the 

 contents of the draft agreement further than to 

 state that they did not infringe the existing treaty 

 rights of other powers in China, the Chinese let 



