CHIXA. 



ih.-i/i i Known, and sought to turn the dissen- 

 , ; , ,.j nil- j'<)\\.T> t<> tluir own advantage. The 

 iaip'i-t 1 viceroys, who had been appointed ad- 

 \i-,,r\ !re:iibn> of ilir peace commission, sent a 

 -troii'" remonstrance to the court against signing 

 tin- trcatv a> it would impair Chinese sovereignty 

 in tin- northern territories, though Russia had 

 agreed to accept a le>s stringent control over the 

 , fvil adminMration in Manchuria and to renounce 

 ln-r pretensions to exclusive rights in .Mongolia 

 and Turkestan, and also the cession of Kinchau. 

 \ new article was introduced stating that, China 

 having broken her engagement by giving the rail- 

 road from Shanhaikwan to Shinmintmg as se- 

 curitv for a foreign loan. Russia shall have the 

 ri.'ht* to construct a branch of the Manchurian 

 Railroad to the boundary of Pechili at the Great 

 Wall. Tin- Imperial Government directed the Chi- 

 nese ministers in Europe to appeal to the powers 

 to intercede with Russia and induce her to either 

 forego demands which were injurious to China 

 ami countries having treaty rights in Manchuria, 

 or to inlluence Russia to extend the time so as 

 to allow further negotiations, the Russian Gov- 

 ernment having notified the Chinese court that an 

 answer was expected by April 2. The convention 

 was not signed at that term, the Yangtse vice- 

 roys having added to the protests of the powers a 

 declaration that they would not recognize it if 

 Mgned. China had 'been informed that Russia 

 would tear up the draft unless it was signed at 

 the date appointed. On April 3 the Russian Gov- 

 ernment notified the powers that it did not in- 

 tend to proceed further with the Manchurian 

 agreement, but would await the development of 

 events, though regretting that the intention to 

 bring the occupation to a speedy termination and 

 to submit the arrangements for effecting that end 

 to the ministers at Pekin had come to naught. 

 China, in notifying Russia of her inability to sign, 

 aid that in the perilous situation which she 

 was passing through it was impossible to grant 

 s|H-cial privileges to one power when others ob- 

 jected h'st she alienate the sympathies of all. The 

 efTWt of the diplomatic intervention of the powers 

 had, according to the Russian view, the effect of 

 prolonging the occupation and attendant Russi- 

 fication of Manchuria. In the Russian circular 

 note Russia renounced all negotiations, since a 

 Hpecial agreement, instead of serving as an open 

 testimony of Russia's friendly sentiments toward 

 China, might involve that neighboring empire in 

 various difficulties. 



The Russian minister demanded the resumption 

 of the Manchurian negotiations after the signa- 

 ture of the protocol. The work of railroad con- 

 struction was pushed rapidly in Manchuria, many 

 thousands of laborers being brought from the 

 south. Chinese emigration into Siberia reached 

 such dimensions that the Russian authorities 

 took measures to stop it as much as possible. The 

 junction of the Port Arthur Railroad with the 

 main Manchurian line was effected in July. Sir 

 Robert Hart appointed Russian officials to col- 

 lect the maritime customs in Manchuria, -who also 

 collected the native customs. The Tartar general, 

 Tseng-Chi. who had been removed after signing 

 the agreement with Admiral Alexeieff, but was 

 reinstated at the demand of Russia, was con- 

 firmed in his office for four years. In Turkestan, 

 well as in Manchuria, and even in Tibet, the 

 prestige and influence of Russia seemed to grow 

 nmazingly as the result of the Chinese troubles, 

 ivoys of the Dalai Lama went to visit the Czar 

 the summer, the mission being represented as a 

 religious one due to the fact that the Czar had 

 some millions of Buddhists among his subjects. 



Politico-Commercial Rivalries. Connected 

 with the Manchurian question were the Anglo- 

 Russian disputes about railroads in north China, 

 which were incidents of a rivalry that began long 

 before the Boxer outbreak. In the railroad con- 

 vention between England and Russia Eng- 

 land promised not to interfere in railroad mat- 

 ters north of the Great Wall. The other sections 

 of the northern railroads, which connect Pekin 

 with the sea, built with about 3,000,000 of Brit- 

 ish capital, and constituting the only British 

 enterprise in China, were regarded as a polit- 

 ical rampart against the progress of Russian in- 

 fluence and control into China proper. These rail- 

 roads were torn up by the Boxers and by the 

 Chinese troops that opposed the advance of the 

 allies to Pekin. When Count von Waldersee ar- 

 rived at Tientsin on Sept. 27, 1900, the first ques- 

 tion that confronted him was with regard to the 

 reconstruction and control of the railrpads. Gen. 

 Gaselee thought that the British superintendent 

 of the line, Mr. Kinder, could collect Chinese 

 workmen, recover hidden material, and get the 

 line into working order quickly under the control 

 of the British military authorities. The Russians 

 having already occupied the railroads and begun 

 repairs, and the British being not yet in sufficient 

 force even to guard the line, and having to de- 

 pend on Chinese workmen, which seemed to be 

 out of the question from a military point of view, 

 the field-marshal decided to entrust the section 

 between Tongku and Yangtsun to the Russians, 

 while the one from Yangtsun to Pekin would be 

 reconstructed by the Germans assisted by the 

 British and other allied troops. The part running 

 up from Tongku to Shanhaikwan he decided to 

 place also in charge of the Russians. The Luhan 

 line in the interior, in which French bondholders 

 were interested, had already been occupied by 

 French troops. Gen. Gaselee obtained the support 

 of the American and Japanese generals for his 

 contention that civilian management would be 

 more effective. Count von Waldersee was not 

 shaken in his opinion, and on Oct. 18, 1900, issued 

 the order for a strictly military .control, giving 

 to the Russians control of the line between Yang- 

 tsun and Shanhaikwan, while a German officer, 

 Major Bauer, was appointed to repair and protect 

 the section from Yangtsun and Pekin with Ger- 

 man, British, and Japanese troops. Complaints 

 about the transfer of the railroad to the Russians 

 and arrangements made to secure material be- 

 longing to the Belgian company owning the 

 Pekin and Hankow Railroad when presented at 

 Berlin again and again were simply forwarded to 

 Count von Waldersee, to whom military matters 

 had been entrusted. Representations were made 

 subsequently at St. Petersburg also by the British 

 Government. Direct negotiations with the Rus- 

 sian Government were more fruitful, and finally 

 an arrangement was made for the transfer of the 

 line from Shanhaikwan to Yangtsun to Count 

 von Waldersee, to be given fry him into the .control 

 of the British. The railroad was formally handed 

 over to the Germans on Jan. 15, 1901, and by 

 them transferred to the British on Feb. 21. Th'o 

 extension of the northern railroad from Shan- 

 haikwan to Shinminting and Niuchuang was not 

 restored to the British, but remained in Russian 

 control. Russia offered to- buy this part of the 

 line from the Chinese Government. This would 

 secure the English bondholders from loss, but the 

 English Government would not readily sanction 

 this solution, which would be in violation of a 

 covenant not to alienate any part of the line. 

 The concession for a great trunk railroad running 

 through China from Pekin to Canton had been 



