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LI-HUNG-CHANG. 



of prints, and Samuel P. Avery presented his re- 

 markable collection of more than 17,000 etchings 

 and lithographs to that institution. Since then, 

 exhibitions of the works of Turner, Whistler, 

 Kembrandt (loaned by J. Pierpont Morgan), and 

 others have been held. Print departments are a 

 recognized factor in large European libraries, such 

 as the British Museum, the Bibliotheque Na- 



. tionale, and the Hofbibliothek in Vienna. Many 

 years of opportunities for purchasing on the spot, 

 state aid, and, above all. appreciation of art 

 these have obviously been the advantages that 

 made such large and fine collections possible. The 

 taste for such things is of more recent date here. . 

 There is now a print department in the Con- 

 gressional Library at Washington, and one in the 

 Fogg Art Museum in Harvard University. The 

 Boston Museum of Fine Arts has an excellent 

 collection, and the Pennsylvania Academy of Fine 

 Arts possesses about 60,000 prints. There are 

 also private collectors of discriminating taste. 

 Before the Public Library formed this new de- 

 partment, New York city had no public collec- 

 tion of prints. Mr. Avery's good example has 

 already been emulated by Charles Stewart Smith, 

 C. B. Curtis, and other donors. These accessions, 

 together with the prints that were in the library 

 before (coming from the Lenox, Duyckinck, Til- 

 den, Ford, and other collections), form a note- 

 worthy beginning. A certain amount of this ma- 

 terial has a historical rather than an artistic in- 

 terest. In fact, in an institution like this, the 

 usefulness of prints is emphasized. Portraits, 

 views of places and buildings, historical scenes, 

 costumes, ships, vehicles, and the thousand and 

 one other things that form documents for the 

 social history of mankind, are to be found in a 

 well-conducted print-room and form a store of 

 material to be drawn upon by the artist, the his- 

 torian, the author, the actor, students of various 

 specialties, and the general reader as well. The 

 fact that most prints can be put to such use 

 does not detract from their artistic value. 



LI-HUNG-CHANG, a Chinese statesman, 

 born in Ho-Fei, Nganwhei, Feb. 16, 1823; died in 

 Pekin, Nov. 7, 1901. He received the degrees of 

 bachelor and master, and in 1847 that of doctor 

 of the Han-Lin Academy. But his rapid rise to 

 prominence and power was not due to scholarship 

 and literary elegance, but to his association with 

 Col. Gordon in the suppression of the Taeping re- 

 bellion. He was sent to his native province in 

 1853 to exercise the troops. He secured the serv- 

 ices of Frederick T. Ward (an American) and 

 Charles George Gordon; and when their trained 

 troops with European arms turned the tide in 

 favor of the Government he was made command- 

 er-in-chief of the imperial army, and he bore off 

 the honors when the great danger to the dynasty 

 was overcome by the final victory over the rebels 

 in 1864. Although Gordon, to whose ability to 

 organize and train the Chinese soldiers for real 

 fighting the victory was largely due (Ward was 

 killed in 1862), had promised the rebel leaders at 

 Suchow their lives, he was overruled by Gen. Li, 



' who gave orders that all should be killed. This 

 perfidious act gained for him elevation in rank 

 and political promotion. He was already Gov- 

 ernor of Kiangsu, and in 1865 he was appointed 

 viceroy of the two Kiang provinces. In December, 

 1866, he was nominated minister plenipotentiary, 

 and in February, 1867, was made Viceroy of Hong- 

 Kwang. He became a member of the Grand Coun- 

 cil in 1868, was sent as imperial commissioner to 

 Szechuen in 1869, and in August, 1870, in conse- 

 quence of the Tientsin massacre, his diplomatic, 

 political, and military abilities and special ac- 



quaintance with Europeans and their methods 

 won for him the appointment of Viceroy of Pe- 

 chili, the metropolitan province. In this post he 

 remained twenty-four years, during which he was 

 practically Chancellor of the empire and guardian 

 of the throne, retaining the confidence of the Em- 

 press Dowager, and having such a predominant 

 voice in the counsels of the empire that, while 

 his adherents and sycophants were innumerable, 

 his foes were bitter and not few. In foreign affairs 

 he had unchallenged control, and in the introduc- 

 tion of Western technical methods, in starting 

 coal-mines, metallurgical industry, steamship 

 navigation, telegraphs, and railroads, he took the 

 foremost part. As governor and viceroy of the 

 richest provinces he had amassed an enormous for- 

 tune through the Chinese custom of giving pres- 

 ents or bribes for promotion and other official 

 favors; and when he was placed at the head of 

 the capital province and became the strongest 

 politician at court his revenue from gifts grew 

 amain. In the capitalistic enterprises that he 

 founded he embarked his own fortune freely, and 

 saw to it that it did not diminish. With provin- 

 cial and imperial funds he began a Chinese navy, 

 and he engaged foreign officers to teach European 

 tactics and the use of firearms to a corps of picked 

 troops that he intended to be the nucleus of an 

 imperial army able to meet European troops in 

 the field. Arsenals and arms factories were estab- 

 lished with foreign managers and technical in- 

 structors. He encouraged also schools of West- 

 ern learning, and was himself a believer in the 

 medical skill of foreign physicians. His intellect 

 was as keen and critical, and as free from the 

 trammels of heredity and environment, as that of 

 any contemporary statesman. He was as con- 

 fident as any Chinaman of the essential superi- 

 ority of Chinese civilization, but was conscious of 

 the military and political weakness of China, and 

 was not alone in his desire and endeavor to make 

 China strong enough to resist external foes. In 

 the Korean crisis his diplomatic craft did not 

 avail. He had to defy Japan in a matter that 

 touched national pride and imperial prestige, and 

 when the Japanese declared war and proceeded to 

 invade Chinese territory the court looked con- 

 fidently to him to crush the audacious manikins 

 with his European-drilled troops. Although he 

 was probably the only Chinese official who recog- 

 nized from the beginning that the war was hope- 

 less, he had to accept the post of commander-in- 

 chief. His trained troops he did not send against 

 the Japanese, but kept for the defense of Pekin, 

 together with the best of the Manchu regiments. 

 He gathered the worthless provincial soldiery, 

 whose officers had to fill out their ranks with 

 vagabonds and criminals, to be food for Japanese 

 powder in Manchuria while he could organize a 

 more effective line of defense for the capital prov- 

 ince. His fleet he made the best use of that he 

 could, and his officers and gunners fought both 

 well and ill according to their partial knowledge 

 and imperfect training; but neither ships nor sail- 

 ors could accomplish anything against the thor- 

 oughly modern Japanese navy. After defeat was 

 acknowledged he had to bear the odium, but he 

 escaped the usual fate of unsuccessful generals 

 because there was no other diplomatist as capable 

 as he of making terms with the victorious enemy. 

 He was degraded, stripped of his yellow jacket 

 and peacock plume, and sent into retirement for 

 a brief season to save the face of the court, and 

 then was recalled, though with lessened rank, and 

 sent to Japan as minister plenipotentiary to treat 

 for peace. He obtained better conditions than 

 could have been got by any other Chinaman. At 



