PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. 



527 



surgents were suppressed without difficulty. In 

 Cebu the civil government experienced much dif- 

 ficulty. The insurgents, who were never brought 

 under thorough control, grew bolder when the 

 American garrison was changed. They frequently 

 fired into the town from the hills, and attacked 

 American detachments near headquarters. The 

 civil government was changed by Gen. Chalice 

 for military rule again. The people there had 

 been made to believe that the Americans would 

 bring back the friars. The uncertainty of Ameri- 

 can policy regarding religious orders had much 

 to do with keeping the spirit of rebellion alive in 

 all parts of the Philippines. The restoration of 

 the property of the monasteries that the insur- 

 gents had confiscated was a certainty, and the 

 persons who had profited by the confiscation or 

 had been guilty of crimes against the friars had 

 strong motives for resisting the establishment of 

 American rule. From the period when the insur- 

 gents came into power a growing indifference to 

 religion was observable in all classes. The au- 

 thorities of the Catholic Church were therefore 

 anxious to have order restored and to give to the 

 people priests who would be acceptable to them. 



In Mindanao, peopled by different races of dif- 

 ferent religions and forms of government, Gen. 

 Kobbe was confronted by problems demanding 

 diplomatic handling. He established friendly rela- 

 tions with the Moros, some of whom cooperated 

 with him in suppressing the Filipino insurgents. 

 The American Government made no attempt to 

 interfere with the native government and customs 

 of the Mohammedan peoples living in Mindanao 

 and Sulu, making no declaration even against 

 polygamy or slavery. The native rulers were left 

 in the independent position they had always as- 

 serted under Spanish dominion. Datto Mandi, 

 who rules the Moros about Zamboango, volunta- 

 rily issued a proclamation abolishing slavery. 

 Moro children attended the schools opened in 

 Zamboango, which were soon filled in excess of 

 their accommodations. Rufino de Losa, who for- 

 merly served under Gen. Capistrano, attempted to 

 raise a fresh insurrection in the summer. In a 

 very short time he was forced to retreat into the 

 mountains, where his men deserted him. In Jolo 

 the sultan waged war against the Dattos Calve 

 and Joakainin. The officers in Major Sweet's 

 command patched up a truce several times, but 

 the difficulties always broke out afresh. They 

 decided therefore to let the quarreling chiefs settle 

 their affairs by fighting, which would produce a 

 more lasting peace and would use up their am- 

 munition, which could not easily be replenished 

 under the new regulations. The casualties in two 

 months' fighting, at the end of which the sultan 

 had the rebel chiefs at his mercy, did not exceed 

 50 men, but many women and large numbers of 

 cattle were carried off. 



The Visayan Islands with the exception of 

 Samar were thoroughly pacified, because a vigor- 

 ous campaign had been necessary to stamp out 

 the insurrection in each of them. In Panay, now 

 prospering under civil rule, 4,000 troops had been 

 employed and active operations lasted two years. 

 In Leyte 1,600 troops had required fifteen months 

 to establish American supremacy. They fought 

 400 engagements, and during the operations roads 

 were constructed as fast as possible. Gen. 

 Hughes, whose command embraced Panay and 

 Leyte, had Samar added to it. The accessions to 

 the rebel force from Luzon gave the insurgents 

 greater influence and control over the natives of 

 the island, who number about 200,000 and are 

 particularly fickle and deceitful Malays, ready 

 to take the oath of allegiance and live for months 



>]>-, hut open 

 ;iMe of 

 om- 



on the best of terms with UK 1r< 

 to the influence of the insur; 

 any treachery. The island, which 

 pletely occupied by the Spaiinmi-, ;m| in,,! )( .. 

 ceived but little attention from Un An;<;i i<- ; iiH he- 

 cause no active resistance wa,-, (j their 

 occupation of the coast towns, he'-. 

 to which all the irreconcilable and otil.l; 

 surgents and banditti fled for safety when tj 

 were driven out of the other Visayan islands .1 

 out of Luzon. The bad characters of the A ii 

 archipelago gathered there and compelled or p 

 vailed upon many of the natives to join th n 

 forces. They violated all the rules of civilized 

 warfare. As this was the principal remaining 

 focus of rebellion a considerable American force, 

 set free by the pacification of the other islands, 

 was concentrated there. Gen. Hughes made prog- 

 ress in fighting the insurgents before the rains set 

 in, about Aug. 1. The insurgents were at least 

 driven away from the hills from which they shot 

 into the town itself, and the troops pursued them 

 with vigor. Gunboats ascended the streams 25 

 or 30 miles, but were unable to go farther on 

 account of their deep draft. There were 20 

 American garrisons. On July 26 a body of 50Q 

 insurgents surrendered. The rest were split up 

 into bands, the largest numbering not more than 

 50 men. Samar is a particularly difficult island 

 for military operations, as it is without roads, 

 communications being carried on mainly by water. 

 The surface is made up of wooded mountains and 

 deep valleys covered with swamps and jungle. 

 While active hostilities were in progress in Luzon 

 and in Panay, Negros, and other islands on which 

 the republican government of the Tagalos at- 

 tempted to introduce its rule, this island was com- 

 paratively neglected; and when civil government 

 was installed in most of the islands, this was one 

 of the few left under military rule. Although it 

 is after Mindanao and Luzon the largest of the 

 Philippines, there were only 6 military posts oc- 

 cupied at the beginning of 1901. The island 

 seemed to be under complete control, and civil 

 government was established in the towns after 

 Gen. Hughes had taken matters in hand and 

 posted garrisons in all the towns to protect the 

 authorities and inhabitants from incursions by 

 the insurgents, who had been driven into the cen- 

 tral mountains, roving bands of them committing 

 murders and robberies on the defenseless, but 

 not attempting to attack the Americans since the 

 arrival of reenforcements. The insurgents were 

 not believed to have over 300 rifles on the island. 

 The garrison at Balangiga consisted of a com- 

 pany of the Ninth Infantry, 75 strong. On Sept. 

 28, while the men were at breakfast, the presi- 

 dente and a party of the townspeople advanced in 

 a friendly manner until they got between them 

 and their stacked rifles, and then fell upon them 

 with their bolos, killing Capt. T. W. Connell, 

 Lieut. E. A. Bumpus, Surgeon R. S. Griswold, and 

 48 men, while 24, half of them wounded, escaped 

 to Basei. The bodies of the murdered soldiers 

 were mutilated and burned. Some of the attack- 

 ing party carried rifles which the United States 

 authorities had supplied them with for their de- 

 fense against the insurgents. When the soldiers 

 of the massacred company took up their quarters 

 in the town a short time before they were received 

 with music and feasts. The result was an en- 

 tire lack of watchfulness. As soon as the disaster 

 was known at Catabalogan a sufficient force of 

 American regulars and Macabebes was sent to 

 Balangiga, and the inhabitants of the place fled 

 into the mountains. Gen. Hughes soon had 3,600 

 troops in the island and began a vigorous cam- 



